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term term creates 
more seats 
jumps the 
This is a function ~'-".._ .... , ..... ~ ...... 
major party candidates dips 
funding. 
1998 at 
downward in successive v.n .• ,.,~~.v.~. cycles and in 2004 approaches ... ,r"•-•""'TTT'1> 
Results are similar the '"""., .. _. .... with almost double 
million to over 12 over million 
term completed 2002, raised Senate races 
even 1998 figures to 4.9 million, due to a t.>A.U.U..a.a•v.a. VI'-UH. •. UU.< ..... II.'V 
candidate numbers in 
may then reflect 
attributed to 
1 
in both House and '""T'l'"'"""' 
by 
is seen 
as as 
term out 
first round 
below 
0 
I 
1 8 
is that of 
are even more funding after 
term limits. 
In disparity is much more pronounced. While 
amount has fluctuated, between and losing carlaHJan~s 
continues to .......................... . of almost 
but then two and a half 
~nr•rt:>•:u::o"" again 
senate seats are up for '"-"'""'"--LI'"' 
whom 
IS 
by a 
number 
all40 
two 
seats were term 
seat contests. as well as 
is seen most 
than half the chamber because of term .. , .... r .... ,.,.rt seats. The ................... u ....... raised for 
open seats is over this period significantly in mainly 
because of the plethora the amount open seats. 
Overall, are not to as much money as incumbents, and 
incumbents are well-protected financially House. 
In the Senate, situation The 
similar pattern to the House, but .............. r-,..., ........ U..J.JLI.U. ................. .. 2000 when term limits set 
in. The median amount raised in open seats .;)t;IJlaLC ovr•o.ot"'IC" the total median 
raised suggesting that seats are ......... .,, ......... and -ror.n11,.Q 
much more money because the 2000, challengers are 
on with incumbent senators .I.J.J.'-'''O.A.J.'-lLAA amount .I.U.J.ICIVUo to term 
""'" ... .,,.,., .. ..,. seats as cn,uu:mgers in 
not 
to seats 
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__,........House Republican Total 11,017,702 18,644,928 16,271,916 14,045,784 
- -111- -Senate Democrat Total 3,211,303 4,349,331 5,046,778 1,845,586 
--6-- Senate Republican Total 3,533,641 7,796,097 7,956,288 3,120,106 
Figure 
to a extent 
seen 
Conclusions 
In ................................. u .. ._, electoral ,..,.....,..-........... £,.1-•i-• 
which term 
period between 
as 
must 
...... ....,,,., .. ...,, ........ .,., ....... over 
2000 ......... ...., ...... ._,.. .. in House 
and 2002 in number of term limited .............. ._ ... u ........... and open seats 
attracts more candidates but not appear to favor a number of 
competitive races, either at the general or primary Incumbency advantage still 
and appears stronger with incumbents facing competitive races once are 
elected to office. It appears quality challengers are waiting for open seats in which to 
run, particularly evident in ~eutme races. By '"~""1"~'>"liC' 1 r•n- the .............. .., . ...,._ open seat 
have ..... ,..,.r.,. .... """"rt the total amount contests, term 
because of the number of candidates. However, as 1 "r•nnr"lh.:•n""'' advantages 
increase, so the ability to L .............................. . 
incumbents and challengers. 
races 
in 
minority cartOHlaH~s 
of seats. 
state ...... ,...,, .......... ~ ..... ...., .. 
Thompson et 
lS 
women and minority 1'"P1'"\1'"PI:."P1'"\'t'.l't1Ar\ 
occurred, any, 
term limits took 
Hlr\QTI'""o:>r this 
era (Sarbaugh-
in favor 
Demographic Effects on Concepts of Representation 
(1 on the 
on 
In 
essence, 
or are 
concerns. 
chapter takes specifically at ...... ..., ..... .., ..... IJ representation; that is 
state ""'Fl, .................... jL"" 1n similar 1"1P1''nt"\<f"T1"<:11"'1.1'\111" l"'lt'\<:l1''<:11"'1ro1"'1 
state 
Women Legislators 
opening door to more 
..... ,.,u, ................ ""'"-' to hold legislative would nec:essanl 
..., ................. , ...... groups. to high incumbency 
are not as successful u;r,,n" 1 " rr """""'""'"'"'-'· ... · to the 
women, In would 
to get elected at lower chamber, where 
(Thompson 
two 
""IJJL..._..,,, ......... women 
women not 
to term were 
termed out in 
women at the House (Moen, 
replacement cycle of women the lower chamber 
may be only temporary. 
In Maine, women 
Without a steady 
gains by women in the Senate 
Researchers find that other factors, as reapportionment, benefit women 
candidates more so than term Caress (1996) finds the reapportionment 
election in ...................... , ... u .• , .... brought more women ~.....,IS .... : ....... ..,..,~. the fold than in the 1996 
election when term 
has 
legislature, while 
1JV.u ................. dynamics 
women in state ~.....,~=,~." ................... . 
TO~\s-~.;uu.e ..:n.UUJL"-'"• on 
1990 through 1996, 
'""",nr·r~t"·ar women elected to the California number 
Republican women The 
made by 
have shown an tnc:re4:tse 
women elected to term limited states over term 
were seats 
out 
to more ..................... .. 
women in non-term H-.v-.1-.o.rt 
hrU'Y>r..IO' .......... et women 
candidates more to with 
that term limits 
in state Houses. 
may not enough to ........ , .. ..., ..... ..., .... the number of women legislators 
Recruitment of women to run legislative seats had mixed results in 
term limited states. Bernstein and Chadha (2003) find less than stellar gains for women 
in term limited legislatures and attribute this to the 
in primary and general elections. Women are 
women running and winning 
than men to pursue elective 
office in general. They receive less encouragement to run and tend to view themselves 
as less qualified candidates (Fox and 
shown to 
(Arceneaux 2001). 
Much of 
and the of 
MacManus 
most explanatory 
blame for the 
(Niven 1998). 
that state and 
on female representation in the states 
are most 
not act as 
more 
picture, MacManus et al. (2006) 
women are more likely to run local than state legislature Florida 
The Florida Annual Policy Survey conducted by Florida University between 1999 
and 2003 rated performance government higher than state legislature 
during those years (MacManus 2005). Previous research has also suggested female 
Jl.'•·"f:.,JI..., ........ '"' ........ "' are more found urban areas are within traveling distance to the 
state capital (Nechemias 1985). Tallahassee is located in the Panhandle, a ...... 1"->•u ... ,,..., ..... , ... 
distance from most areas of the state. All of these factors combined show an uphill 
battle for women seeking office and achieving parity with the number of men in 
legislative ...., .... , ............ 
as a 
term 
seats 
.LJI. ........... u.p., is not ...... ..-n.rtv\ 
as as a state. 
that successors are 
seats mt~""r1IT'I c:anclt02Ltes 
L-n:mn~sente~d '"'~"''"',...,., .. ri .... , ..... to the population if the group is 
general (Caress et .LUU\.U.Uv'-'• scholarly work on the o"f--f".<:.l"f-£' term 
on 
Moen, Palmer, and Powell 2005). 
Lublin (1997) shows a link between number of majority-minority districts 
and an in the number African-American legislators. At 
congressional level, very success winning in 
districts with a majority whites. 
Michigan legislature to the redistricting process that creates majority-minority 
districts rather than the term limits. African-Americans are winning 
more seats in majority-minority districts once held by long-term white incumbents, 
although 
2004). 
the successes 
results has found in Michigan (Sarbaugh-Thompson et al. 
successes 
voters are not same 
much cross-over 
voters are districts and ........... ,~L ... ..., .. ~ 
.. 1 • ...., .. ,.., ....... .., ... in minority representation have benefited ..................... A ..... .., candidates not only in 
California also Cain and Kousser 2004), but also in ..... ..., .. ,, ............ 2004 ). 
In Ohio, many term-limited minority legislators are leaving to pursue other 
opportunities and minority representation has not at speed in which 
proponents might have thought (Farmer and 2004). And as discussed with 
women candidates 
may have more to do with electoral fortunes of party affiliation than 
with term limits. 
states much more partisan than party 
and provide much nrl'l•<:lt'l'•r protection incumbent legislators term 
limits the Therefore, if'"""''"'"'~ .. , .. " carlauiau~s are members 
the majority that is more 
term 
a 
party in 
Other Variables Interest 
Aside from demographic ....,.u.u.~,., ... ..., ........... j • .., .... , rPc·P~1rr-hPrc have often posited 
whether the "type" legislator has ..,.u .... L""""' ..... 
age, occupation, education, and .._ ..... , ....... ..., ••. 
term limits in such areas as 
and Powell (2000b) do not find 
any significant changes on of variables comparing term limited and non-term 
limited states. In fact, Sarbaugh-Thompson, Thompson, and (2005) only discuss 
age as an important variable future research. posit that age raises several 
policy and behavioral consequences with changes in different 
legislature including levels of political ambition, priorities, 
According to the State Legislatures, the 
legislators in term-limited states 
•·+..-.., ........ " the 
(2001) find 
under the 
of 
over 
to 
and a more .....,.r,rto"w- 11"1r1"P•~CP 
.... ,.., ........... """" et 
cohorts elected to the 
partisanship. 
age of 
in 
term 
more 
Senate 
members as seen (Berman These findings are likely of 
term-limited House .u .............. ._, • ..., ... .., winning 
the 
more 
to out. 
Schraufnagel's (2004) study legislature from 
the 1999 through the 2003 legislative sessions finds no significant r~ 1 -r-r.,..,..,.'"r'"" in the 
composition of the legislature on the variables of race, n-""'1"n"' • .,. age, occupation, religion, 
or education. Schraufnagel's data assumes that 2000 when term limits were 
implemented Florida, we would see a dramatic change in composition. However, 
this does not account for what changes have been since 1992 when term limits 
were enacted. For instance, many long-time legislators may opted out of the 
legislature early to pursue other elective opportunities. More importantly, this analysis 
does not explore the changing through 2004 which saw 
the rise of the Republican Party in Florida and significance may have on the 
type of legislator now being elected to 
confirm that women not 
made 
voters 
women are more to vote 
out 
women are a 
to 
over the 1990s even more so 
Also, as Squire (1992b) finds, a body is 
with the number women '"""'!'-.""'"'-"' ... ,_,._ ..... ....,_._ .. ,...,..,"'"' .... "' .. legislatures attract 
women the _._...,h._ ................. ... c.,..,..,,1 r'"" is considered a 
This may help""''"'._,_._...._._ .... why women have not significantly increased numbers 
legislature's higher of 
professionalization, including time and resources devoted to "'"" ... "'1 r•.,. (MacManus 2005). 
Florida a good case study to identify changes to minority representation 
the legislature. As MacManus (2004) states, Florida's population resembles the 
diversity of the U.S. as a whole, with Hispanic and blacks cohorts actually above the 
national average. In the decade term limits were the population as a 
whole by with most of the urban areas (MacManus 2001). 
With this major increase in 1-J'Vl-'UH.t.I.-J.'U'~· an 
AU-""'"'-""'~"''-'"" in r>"\"MA1'"1T'(J rer>re~;entat:ton h.ar•nn<'O 
elected 
more 
most 
as 
will to 
some the most concentrated areas 1-lri ... HT•"'rrf counties 
(Hill 2004). These districts, in Broward and Palm ....... ""''"''"' .. A Counties are also 
heavily Democratic and will be more to candidates. 
Miami-Dade, on other hand, is a population A.A..I.'-'1Jo.4U,.LVU, primarily 
Cuban-Americans which favor Republican Hispanic candidates, at least at the state 
The Hispanic population is most heavily concentrated not only 
South Florida, but also Central Florida and Tampa These include not only 
Cuban-Americans, but also those from South America (MacManus 2004). However, 
traditionally, the political power among the Hispanic community Florida has come 
from Miami-Dade's Cuban population (Moreno 2004). these 
differences and the effects of redistricting in the state also play a significant part 
number of minority legislators e1ecte:a to (Hill and Moreno 2002). 
r, "·''"'-• "''""r by party 
seen 
must ne<:;essarll 
include out 
Additionally, there be 
legislator elected in Florida, including and Florida 
has historically been home to large pockets However, .::~vu .. LV"'-0 
over 65 only make-up of voters, although they turnout to vote much 
higher numbers (MacManus 2004). As other term limits literature su~~ge:sts. we may 
find more senior legislators entering office for the time Florida. other 
side of the spectrum, we would to find younger legislative cohorts once 
term limits took older incumbent legislators would be termed out. 
Contrary to previous research, MacManus (1994-95) finds that women in 
legislative politics. A comparison of 
Senate. 
entry into state · 
cohorts will be assessed in both the House 
Looking at the typical Florida legislator not hail from 
profession. In the mid-1990s, were at an all-time low at the House 
(Morris 1997), but (Dye 
to 
is 
are 
label Tl"1l.o3n'\C',OI'<T•O.<' 
Presbyterian, and .......,IJ .• ._....,,_,IJ ... , ... 
demographic and political factors. 
previous would more seen 
to 
a decade 
.... .., ... , .......... u ....... ,;;.. .. ,, .................. coming 
in due to term limits. However, as Rosenthal (1998) out, state legislators on 
average tend to be more educated and significant r~ ....... "" .... """'""'£" are therefore, not 
expected. 
Hypotheses 
limits will have no significant on the number of women in state 
legislative office. 
H2: Term limits will ..--...-u-...-....... minority cmioiom.es, 
away when taking the district rn<::J, Ke·-un 
into account. 
gains will explained 
party ..,.JLLA .. u ....... , ....... _. 
metropolitan areas. 
the 
Additionally, ...... _,._,..__,.._ ........... 
......... ..., .... ,.,.., .. Women and 
candidates general election 
ethnic is compared to The Manual, 
special ...., ... ...,,..,,.,.,"',u. changes in vVJLUIJ'V"'''"'"'-''•• are not 
lar-•·•n.cn are the 
analysis which sometimes .............................. with publication date of 
includes changes 
statistics on 
party affiliation be ass,ess<~a 
Additionally, on 
with the following vUL'vl::.'-JLl'-'·0. legislators under over 
with be 
and 
study7• 
unit of 
Manual 
state AVF-,AU.lO.U ..... U. 
and .............. - ..... women comprised 
The number of women doubled towards the end 
early 1990s. According to Table 3.1, women have 
legislature in both the House 
1. 
total number 
women in the House gone down from a high of 31 in 2000 to 29 in 2004. Women 
have made gains the House Democratic and Republican caucuses since term limits 
were enacted in 1992 and these are significant. of the 1998 general election, 
women comprised 42.6% of the House Democratic caucus, an all-time high for either 
caucus during this period. It also appears that number of seats by women after 
the 2002 election declined slightly 31 women to women, of House to 
respectively. Not 
percentage of total House seats. While the ..... u._ .. ..,,.., .. 
have made the most percentage 
1994. However, these numbers are 
1990s when women were over 25% of the legislature. It .... ._.. .. .,..., ......... 
Women 
account 
40.7% 1 
(47D/73R) 
2000 (31) 
(43D/77R) 
2002 (15) (28) 
(39D/81R) 
2004 19.0% (16) 
(36D/84R) 
Percentage Change (5) 
in House 
1992 20.0% 15.0% (6) 
(20D/20R) 
1994 14.3% (3) 15.0% (6) 
(19D/21R) 
1996 1 (2) 17.4% (4) 15.0% (6) 
(17D/23R) 
20.0% (3) 16.0% (7) 
(15D/25R) 
2000 20.0% (3) (4) 17.5% (7) 
(15D/25R) 
2002 (10) 
(14D/26R) 
2004 (5) 15.4% 
(14D/26R) 
Percentage change (1) 
those senators who are 
to 
Research Table 1 
the Florida Senate as 
House slightly ....,I\.. .. ,....,....,,.,." 
lower than the national 
while the number in 
though these differences are not 
Florida 
"""'~""'"ri,, .... ,.,. to the 
U.S. Census women make up 5 "-''"'''"'_ ...... _ ........... ...,. ... so is a big 
discrepancy between the percentage of female legislators and percentage of the 
population. Their numbers the 
representation. 
legislature are still lacking in descriptive 
Additionally, these have been modest compared to what proponents had 
touted. Women cannot win if they do not run number women 
candidates increased over period? Similarly, how do women the 
electoral process post-term 1 shows 
majority party women candidates in both House and Senate elections combined. What 
is perhaps most striking is 
number women ran as 
women and 
over IJ"""'""""' .......... "'"""' points 
comparison of ...,_._....,,...,"'_._ .... ,u. with 2004. The 
majority party "'0...,,..-u,,oT"" is nearly identical with 51 
yet 
to a 
term 
seems 
plethora 
level of f"f"\l"'Y'IT"\t:>'t1 f"1 '1.T;::>t'1IPC'C' \.l'O.LUv.lY.U.U.H,-''I.J 
relatively poorer T\P1"'f'f"\·rrn<::~1"11'P women. In 2002, women ........... "' ..... .. 
party candidates, but as a whole 
to redistricting in 2002, and a 
achieved winning Due 
the au ... u ....... .., • ...,"- of seats from the 
it 
as seen women 
at 
ultimately win J.""'J".,J.'-'J."''" ... a 
Republican women, particularly in the House, ... L.~. ............ A,,r. 
variables as redistricting and Democratic women 
overall due to such 
ground 
are exploratory and cannot directly attribute the effect of term to modest 
made by women in the legislature, but rather must include political factors. 
Minority Legislators 
In total, minorities, like women, have made modest in the legislature at 
percent of the seats chamber The 
percentage of blacks in ,,.r. ............ ,..-.,,.,. caucus has cmnoonc~nt within 
the party. In 1992, when Florida AJ' ....... _.,,_,...,.._ ...... ..,. included many r-nri~Pt"'\H:at·t'UP Anglos from 
North Florida, blacks made up House caucus and 25.0% of the Senate 
caucus. With the demographic and IJ'V ... L .... , •• , .... " shift in the state has the 
Republican dominant in those COlrlse:rv<:ttnre areas in particular, ........................ ... 
now up of the 
are 
to or are 
percentage 
representation chamber. 
Dade more 
caucus in 1992 at versus seats, 
which now includes non-Cuban '-'~-''"'·Lu.vu, has 111 f"'r<=>'lC'I'>rl 
Republican ............ "'~-'"''LL"'·'<C> were caucus 
are now 1 ln 
has • ...,",. ..... ,LU'-''""' unchanged at 
does not seem to ....... L,..,...., .... 
more of a 
a 
1994 
1996 (15) (26) 
(59D/61R) 
1998 31.9% (15) 0.0% (0) (9) (26) 
2000 37.2% (16) 7.0% 0.0% (0) 1 (9) (28) 
(43D/77R) 
2002 41.0% (0) 14.8% (12) 25.0% (30) 
lR) 
2004 44.4% 1 (1) 14.3% (12) 25.8% 
(36D/84R) 
Percentage 24.7% (2) 1% 5.8% (6) 
Senate 
25.0% (5) 0.0% (0) 15.0% 20.0% (8) 
(20D/20R) 
1994 0.0% (0) 0.0% (3) 20.0% (8) 
(19D/21R) 
1996 (5) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 20.0% 
(17D/23R) 
1998 (5) 0.0% 0.0% 20.0% 
(15D/25R) 
2000 40.0% 0.0% (0) 0.0% 
(15D/25R) 
2002 50.0% (7) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 1 (10) 
(14D/26R) 
2004 50.0% 0.0% (0) 1 (10) 
(14D/26R) 
diluting 
particularly Cuban Republicans. 
slowly increasing, are they 
or Hispanics? Or are they winning 
Table 3.3 lists minority 
general election through the 2004 CT""n.Pr-:ll .PI.P,,...Tir\n 
handful of legislators who replaced incumbents. 
'-'U'a"""· ... "· a black Democrat Florida, Jennifer 
and AI Lawson, a black Democrat from North Florida in 
caucus, 
is 
by blacks 
white incumbents? 
the 2000 
there are only a 
House these include Joyce 
a black Republican 
Tallahassee area. Only 
four minority legislators in the House do not represent majority-minority districts with 
two of those, Ed Jennings and Jennifer Carroll, hailing from relatively "safe seats" from 
their parties. In the Senate, two senators, AI Lawson and Bullard, represent 
non majority-minority districts, but an edge in the number of re~~tstere:a 
Democratic voters. With 
redistricting, TT'I'"IT"'Inn 
votes to 
a 
inl"'·r.Pr:JOC'i...,.n importance due to 
apparent 
51% with an increase of 
legislators, all but Quinones benefited more 
ensured a member of their would be eiel;Lelu. 
political fortunes and district make-up of a seat 
minority candidate is able to 
limits. 
Other 
a 
seat is even 
Republican seat 
u.u. ........... J=.. to 
Vo;.J.t.;H.V.IlVU. voters to 
remainder of 
seats 
results suggest that 
have more to do with whether a 
a direct of term 
Interest 
As hypothesized, is the Ultf=..AHJ.J,.., ..... " ... factor, but found only in the .a..&.v, .... ...,....,. The 
number of legislators under the of however, rlt:>I""'I"P<:iC"I"•rl as a ~01r"£'onf-l'lln".O. of the 
House as seen in Figure over 
1994. To assess increase women over 
55 is ........... , ................ .... women over 
from "'""''""'""""'·•..,a.. is ........ , ................. 
Table 3.3. Voter Statistics in Districts with Minority Legislators Post- Term Limits, 2000-2004. 
White %Black % Hisp. %Other %Reg. %Reg. %Reg. Ind. 
Elected Ethnicity Reg. Reg. Reg. Reg. Rep. Dem. 
Curtis 8 2000 Dem. Black 74.4 12.5 
Richardson 
Terry Fields 14 2000 Dem. Black Jackson ville 32.7 63.1 0.8 3.5 14.9 76.5 8.7 
Ed Jennings 23 2000 Dem. Black Gainesville 59.1 26.4 2.7 11.8 23.3 55.7 21.0 
Joyce Cusack 26 2000 Dem. Black Central Florida 87.1 6.6 3.4 2.9 38.7 43.9 17.4 
Gary Siolin 39 2000 Dem. Black Central Florida 26.6 56.8 8.0 8.6 16.6 68.5 14.9 
Frank Peterman 55 2000 Dem. Black TamoaBay 43.3 52.2 1.7 2.7 20.8 64.9 14.3 
Arthenia Joyner 59 2000 Dem. Black Tampa Bay 35.1 55.1 5.7 4.1 16.3 69.1 14.6 
James Harper 84 2000 Dem. Black Palm Beach 43.3 49.6 3.3 3.7 22.2 62.8 15.0 
Matt Meadows 94 2000 Dem. Black South Florida 26.1 65.6 2.6 5.8 11.4 75.1 13.4 
RalphArza 102 2000 Rep. Hispanic South Florida 30.4 3.7 61.8 4.1 52.1 27.8 20.2 
Tee Holloway 103 2000 Dem. Black South Florida 8.5 66.8 20.8 3.9 14.9 71.9 13.1 
Phil Brutus 108 2000 Dem. Black South Florida 22.8 59.0 12.6 5.6 13.0 74.1 12.9 
Dorothy 109 2000 Dem. Black South Florida 7.0 63.9 25.5 3.7 18.1 71.2 10.7 
Bendross-
Min din gall 
Rene Garcia 110 2000 Rep. Hispanic South Florida 19.6 2.5 74.2 3.6 59.6 24.0 16.4 
Mario Diaz- 112 2000 Rep. Hisoanic South Florida 25.0 2.8 67.8 4.5 52.4 25.5 
Balart 
Ed Bullard 118 2000 Dem. Black South Florida 34.1 33.6 27.5 4.7 27.8 54.0 18.2 
Audrey Gibson 15 2002 Dem. Black Jackson ville 43.4 50.9 1.2 4.5 19.9 67.5 12.5 
Bruce Antone 39 2002 Dem. Black Central Florida 33.4 51.8 6.7 8.3 20.6 64.1 
John Quinones 49 2002 Rep. Hispanic Central Florida 51.0 8.0 32.6 8.5 31.5 44.4 24.1 
Yolly Roberson 104 2002 Dem. Black South Florida 25.2 54.3 15.1 5.6 12.1 73.3 14.6 
David Rivera 112 2002 Rep. Hispanic South Florida 35.1 5.2 55.4 4.7 48.8 29.3 21.8 
Juan-Carlos "JC" 115 2002 Rep. Hispanic South Florida 41.8 2.0 52.5 3.7 50.4 31.6 17.9 
Planas 
Marcelo Llorente 116 2002 Rep. Hispanic South Florida 25.6 3.7 65.6 5.0 47.1 29.8 23.1 
Julio Robaina 117 2002 Rep. Hispanic South Florida 40.5 1.7 53.9 3.9 52.1 30.8 17.2 
Juan Zapata 119 2002 Rep. Hispanic South Florida 40.9 5.5 50.2 4.4 45.0 33.7 21.2 
Jennifer Carroll 13 2003 Rep. Black Jacksonville 83.9 9.2 2.1 4.7 48.2 36.9 15.0 
Priscilla Taylor 84 2004 Dem. Black Palm Beach 40.4 53.0 3.9 3.6 20.2 65.1 14.7 
Carlos Lopez- 113 2004 Rep. Hispanic South Florida 23.0 9.5 63.6 4.0 49.6 34.0 16.3 
Cantera 
Anitere Flores 114 2004 Rep. Hisoanic South Florida 38.1 4.2 53.8 4.0 48.7 18.7 
Les Miller 21 2000 Dem. Black Tampa Bay 46.5 43.3 6.5 3.7 20.0 64.2 15.7 
Alex Villalobos 37 2000 Rep. Hispanic South Florida 31.6 3.0 61.3 4.1 50.5 29.4 20.0 
Rudy Garcia 39 2000 Rep. Hisoanic South Florida 24.9 2.7 68.0 4.3 52.8 27.3 19.9 
Tony Hill 1 2002 Dem. Black Jacksonville 47.8 46.4 1.3 4.5 22.5 65.3 
Gary Siplin 19 2002 Dem. Black Central Florida 47.7 24.6 19.5 8.2 27.7 52.3 20.0 
Frederica Wilson 33 2002 Dem. Black South Florida 13.9 62.6 18.6 5.0 14.5 72.3 13.3 
Larcenia Bullard 39 2002 Dem. Black South Florida 47.2 35.0 13.9 3.9 25.6 57.8 16.7 
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None of the other religion -- ar~ 
significant in other demographic variables are 
and the 
Republican takeover in the As for occupation, number of lawyers 
House has fluctuated from a low of in to a of 2004. In the 
Senate, however, those the in to 
2004. the 
House 
to 
over 
House. 
full-time duties as legislators 
While the education 
there are a slightly larger percentage legislators in the House 
to 
to 
and doctoral degrees from 14.2% in 
graduate degrees increased from in 1992 to 17.5% 2004. While not 
As expected, religious differences are not significant. However, the percentage of 
members in the House that identify themselves as Catholics has grown 16.7% in 
1992 to over a quarter of the chamber at 27.5%, while percentage of Jewish 
legislators has gone down slightly by 3.3% over The situation is 
similar in the Senate with the only noticeable .l.l.l'-'1.""""'""' is pet~cetlta~~e of Catholic 
legislators from 15% to 27.5% between 1992 The of 
experience will be explored the following chapter to identify 
elective 
the 
background of 
term 
.lVAJLucu., women 
VJJ\.d..U.1Jl~ seats once 
.................... ...., "'fi>"·'""" ... to 
seats 
chamber than 
to 1"'1'"\ ..... t ...... ,.,. 
the Senate has not ovr•""""''"'~""rt the national average. 
have significantly nrt•:rn.-..t-nr~""'ri women overall 
legislature. 
most 
In 
women 
not appear to 
the 
On the other hand, women candidates are being recruited more strategically with 
party leaders, in particular hand-picking quality women candidates and not just 
"sacrificial lambs". This explain why women are winning seats.at much higher 
percentages than the Women candidates are more likely to win when they run 
post-term limits as evidenced by the 2002 2004 general election results. Cross-state 
comparisons with term-limited and non-term limited states may show a ..... ._,~. ... ..., .... ...,u ... ,.., 
whether quality women candidates will continue to 
difference between these types of legislatures. 
Minority legislators have made modest 
legislators, now u.lvJ.U\JL"-' 
is a 
limits. 
Democrat 
redistricting and 
the Florida legislature. Most minority ·-,_,, ...................... , ..... 
legislators from majority-minority ............. ~ ..... "' ...... and 
Scholars suggested that 
~-" ................. ...," ... party and it 
.................. ..., ..... , ... over the next 
""'"'"'"''" ....... "' ... ...,;;;,, ................... ...,J .... JI can have 
significant policy consequences is a subject that needs more 
exploration in determining key ........ '"" ... ...., .. ,...,....,.., between descriptive and substantive 
representation. 
With a significant factor House, number of 
increasing in both the question P.V1''\PMP1"'1f'P must now be re-examined. 
What kind background do these legislators have, elective 13VT'\PMP1"'1/'P 
Certainly 
of politics general. the cohorts 
experience, the opponents as a ...................... ...., ... .. 
process next..., .. "' ................ ... 
term 
movement 
legislature of career ._.. ..... , ........ .., ....... uu. Most ....... .._..,..,,,....,..._,.at '-''V.U.~JLVUU• 
but the Florida applied to .. u ............. .._....., .... This chapter 
seeks to whether term limits have indeed 
and attaining office are still politically ambitious. This chapter 
questions: 
legislators with little or no previous 
the average turnover and tenure 
as "citizen" 
What there been on 
and limits? Lastly, once 
legislators leave office, due to term limits or resignation, they continue on a 
political career path, elective or 
Recent Research of Career Path Decisions Term-Limited States 
Reforming legislatures through term limits was touted as a way to create more 
opportunities for .................... ,. ..... to serve. 
politicians no 
not 
to challengers. Many members who 
money, tapping political connections, and 
strategy. This data suggests that instead 
legislative office, those that have 
and Kousser 2004). 
attracting successful non-politicos to state 
advantage also 
Further, those with previous elective ""'""l~'"'o~- ... ....., .... ...,.., are more likely to run for another 
political office once they are term-limited 2003). before empirical 
evidence surfaced the mid- to late-1990s when term limits began to 
expertise of governance will opt to stay in the "business of governance." Incoming 
legislators who exhibit progressive ambition will not likely serve the length of their 
allotted term, but rather jump at opportunities to higher office (Copeland 1992). 
Indeed, competition U.S. House seats 
compared to those without term limits. 
likely to 
are not '"''-:l.,T,.,,IT 
seats 
et 
or 
increased in states with term limits 
term 
to run 
term '"'1"'\1nAT"'f-H-rll1f""f structure. 
between term and n-r&:>•:lt-""r interchamber movement. 
has been evident in California where 90% of senators in 2001 had 
the House (Cain and Kousser 2004 ). 
vast 
to 
elective 
The choice to leave early seems to vary by the type of legislature. Heberling and 
in 
Leland (2004) find that those in legislatures with higher pay, 
longer sessions, and more staff tend to wait longer on to retire or seek other 
offices. Powell (2003) provides that legislators in 
professional legislatures see as a career and are more likely to early when 
opportunities present themselves. Florida is a semi-full time legislature 
partly because of the short 60-day legislative session and lower pay combined with 
higher number of staff (National Conference of State 2005). Many 
legislators have full-time work. Thus, 
term limits on individual career "" ... ,_, .. _,.,...., 
seats 
of 
are no term 
voter 
Florida, there are 1, 
municipal governments, school C.ls.trJr..;t."'...,, and '-'J...I'"'""'.l'"'".ll '""'·· ~---· ~--~ Census 
annexation unincorporated Bureau 2002). through the end of this decade, 
number of elective offices 
in Florida. Due to the sheer volume local elective positions, seeking office at the 
local level may be a more feasible option for those wanting to stay public life. 
Additionally, term-limited legislators influence policy through not only and 
lower elective offices, but also through non--elective political positions, including the 
state executive branch and lobbying (Maddox 
Political Ambition 
Based on these findings, this study some entering the state 
legislature will display what Schlesinger (1966) called "progressive ambition". Those 
to move up political ladder and continue on a with progressive ambition will 
political career path. Schlesinger's assumptions are ambitious politicians are 
norm """'''VlllUV.l'-' ""',,.,. ...... , .... ...., .... at winning 
a career 
to serve retreat to It is 
term to attract to state 
if 
they are not actors with ................... ....., .. ..., .... ,, .. ..,._,.u •. u.~·A· to 
Other legislators, particularly at the 
federal have progressive ambition and will take to run higher when 
there is a more likely chance of winning (Rohde 1979, Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde 
political conditions are favorable (Jacobson and Kernell1981). In Florida, the "resign 
to vacate to run" laws enacted in 
their seats to run for other positions. An assumption can be made that state 
legislators who resign to run will be strategic in decisions. Members who are 
term-limited, however, may not be able to advantage ideal political situations in 
which to run other offices. Therefore, those that resign to run would likely be more 
successful in advancing their political careers than members forced out office to 
term limits. 
Schlesinger's study 
opportunity structure to 
and a state. 
have ..,....,..r"'""'1r-tn1n1t-1 
state .n,.,t:::;.A.UA..-... .oc 
on an 
number 
so, too 
up to move to 
structure 
serve as 
conduits to 
within and are often 
is no longer a career legislature in 
not TU"T>m•n.r"" 
In term-limited states 
question is not 
how it has impacted the political careers those legislature Florida has become, 
elected to the body. Have term T'\rrHT>i""IC>nl state -"""'P...,S.UL .... ,.__. 
as Tothero 
political careers in the state legislature stalled and become the 
members? 
members with a 
suggests? Or have 
stop for legislative 
Hypotheses 
Based on these findings, the following hypotheses are proposed 
H1: Legislators entering state legislative office in Florida will have more 
previous elective""''"'~-""" ............... ""' .... 
H2: Legislators who vacate 
up will run for other 
H3: Legislators 
of 0"£Y'i.ll'>t"'1nmP1"'1t 
the post-term era. 
seats ..... .,.,_.....,. ... "" allotted 8 
at 
are 
have 
serve as a basis 
term limits .................. .. 
Tenure 
calculated as the total number 
consecutively at time of 
seats to take political appointments, 
will 
resignations to run for other '"' ...... ....,...,u. 
each 
consecutively 
• ..-.i-,"' ... """i- here 
non-
or vacate their 
The data selected career paths LL.~L~-·~ .u .• ...., ....... VVllU 
u....,...,,_, .. '"' ... .., through 2003-2004 ._,....,.., ...... V' .... _, who vac:uea seats prior to 
to 
is 
were 
who""""'·"··'._ ......... , ...... 
to term .............. .., ...... '"' ....... , 
those running 
Lastly, 
same members who have 
career paths of 
political ambitions 
brought in more "citizen .. ...,F,, .. ._. ........ VJL'-' 
Results 
Previous 
The phase of the .. ""~.................... career 
House and ;)enat.e members. 
would open the 
opposite case. 
term 
as 
are not 
success rate 
us AA.L'U'AUC£"'"-·"-'AA on the 
to see if term has indeed 
at previous 
UUf''-,fo,VUO..'-'._., term 
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Senate Members Previous 
the 
Table 1 
2000 62.5% 
2002 66.7% 
2004 
level, while 
experience, members who 
existent in the . ",,,,,-,,,._,, 
<3V1',.,.....,,"""''"""" come from 
council members, 
In the .:)erlme _ .._.._,._, .. _.., .. _......, .. 
·from the ....... v.._.,_,..., 
In 
(120) 
100.0% 
(40) (1) 
2004. Those previous ....... '"' .... '-'""' 
date 
J.U,'VJ.J..lL'VLU of 
those with 
as a 
1998 
2ooo* 
2004 
the 1994 elections, and a majority the 
senators 
House seats 
(40) 
100.0% (40) 
won a 
as 
House. Many 
to term 
Alternatively, the ~A .... ,, .... vv• of 
VL'-'''-''-'..:l is diminishing. 
7.5% 
a 
How 
Table 4.3 shows 
chambers, the ~u.F,.H,., ... ~ 
term 
November 1998 is 
dips to 
term 
In of 
andin In 
and a median 0.0 
the Senate 2002, when second wave of term limits took 
number of years is 2.4 with a .... ._. .......... ~ ... , ... 
However, how are these figures compared to 
Republican takeover the Florida House and ._....,,,HA .... ...,. 
chambers without previous '"'"·'0J""""""''""""" 
•::nn=•r<:ll'Tt=J. number 
Senate is "'{"\'"Y\""'"'11 
median 
mean 1 
on 
as 
both 
before 
House in 2000, that 
the House. In 
average 
With 
the 
a 
a 
the amount t:I>V1''\t:I>.-.A"Y\f~t:l> of 
Jrl.T"\rTD>T" J.U..:>LJ.t.U,LJ.V~H .. l..l ,...,..l:l,.,..,...., .... ....,,:>l' will not ..... arco•cof" 
profound 
wave term 
2010 in the Senate may once again show a .. ~ .. ""-"'"'-"""''-' ...... ....,""""-' .... '~""' 
pv·npr--.Pl'l~P within each 
According to these 
tenure 
to 
turnover turnover rate 
to seats 
with 
in 
seats 
to run 
once are out 
How 
going to vacate seats 
due to midsession vacancies are 
or to 
shows an increase in the number of'-'~-"'"""" ......... '""''""'""''"'-'·,. . ..., 
their last term 
some left 
in the number 
appointive ........ n, ....... vuu 
...,L.ULU.LL.U to 
run for 
Table 4.4 
left 
contains 
elective 
term J.J..LLU.<.'-''"""' 
Most vacated their seats to run 
of 
general through the 
record House 
term. 
to run 
seats 
while 
or 
leave order to 
Senate 
were 
is ''"""r""''"'',..,"''r1 that term •·~--+n.rl .,.....'""""'"'"""" .. " 
'-'L.._ ...... ..,..:J. either higher or 
of term-limited .,......a,.,......l-\t:>-rc 
run In 
term 
Elected 
Defeated 
Statewide 
Elected 
Defeated 
Defeated 
Local 
Elected 
No immediate run 
**In 
2004. 
to run 
were to 
0 7 
5 3 
0 1 
2 2 
11 7 
8 8 
1 2 
51 
careers 
1 4 
1 2 
1 2 
4 4 
1 0 
0 0 
5 3 
1 1 
16 
NA 
to 
November 
ran as 
two 
In are 
viable and .,y,.,....,...., . .,"'.._ 
to both a 
"'"'"r'""" ... " to 
In of term .. ._ ... __ u~'""- ...... 'tY\t:>rY'n""-.. " 
including many at the level. With no term ................................ Hu .. 
"'-''VllL"'-L'VI .. HJ. coupled a high incumbency 
a they are 
a base of 
Similar to .......... "''""''"'""'· 3 out of 11 former ...... '"' ......... ...., M"'lt:>M"'Ih•""r" a 
Many former ....... ..., ... u_..., . .., ... ..... • ... J.~L._..._ .. ,F-. to run 
2005 are 
that 
local 
current political 
avenue to win .......... ,'"" ..... "" ... ..,. 
at 
at a 
or are 
career 
paths 
on the jJ'U'JLLO.A•vU.JL r\rr'•f"'t:>(~(' and 
lobbyists will 
Those that 
positions in 
Gov. Jeb Bush, ""'~~·.,.rr.:~ 
branch at the state 
Republican state J.""A·"'"'""'u-""' .. 
Much of ""''-'1-'"'nu ... u on the party of 
the opportunity to 
the same party as 
current 
career 
with the exception one took 
. With 
were T.,..,.,.,..,."""" to ""'""'""'"'T' 
"'-"-'h""""""'"""".., only 
branch when are 
Florida 
Lobbyist/ Advocate 
.~.....~.u."""'"""'u Official 
will 
shows, 
0.0% 
is it 
0.0% (0) 
0.0% (0) 45.0% (18) 
2.5% (1) 
(40) 
would also have an 
process. 
or 
Additionally, the 
'M>rr~ft"1"i"'C'C' 1 'tlA ambition 
professional .. ...,,_., .... _. ................ ...,..., ............... ~.,h 
concerns (Maestas 
state level to "bring home 
turnover every 
beneficial to 
..,a ............... ""' ... most profoundly ...... _.._ . .,.., .. ~.~.AI"-, 
state Senate as 2004 were -r-.-.-.-m,,. .......... .....,._..J.., TY'IOTY ...... ,., .. .,. 
or more. 
once 
to 
era 
state 
more 
use at 
higher membership 
not 
more 
term 
Many 
many are vu ..... .~. .. ;:;. 
amount 
case a 
and ~"n .. ,a.-.rC' 
are thus ,,'l,~~r·•r~ sets 
show that as 
rate is not as u'"''"''-'00UJ.H 
compared to those who resigned to run 
seems to successive runs 
for 
run immediate I y 
to run 
was 
of 
to 
or appointive 
out of ........... ,L..., ...... 
l-In"""""'"'' .. the success 
have...__,.,.,.,...._..,.,.,.,.,... 
upward trend 
who 
a 
seats. at 
to 
is no a 
not run at 
Jeb Bush took a 
reasonable chance at careers the state executive ........... ""A'"'~ .. were appointed to 
high level positions, including Cabinet-level 1-''-'·=u._ .. ,..._ ... ,..,. as 
Speaker, John For 
serve public 
legislature voluntarily or .... u_,U' .... "-.. 
to serve on executive boards 'l-n•"\Atnt-t:•rt by the nrHTOr1"\A1'" or 1'"0M•r'OC'AnT local 
entities at local level. 
While to careers, more 
not. A majority 
and "-'l'U'-''-'•-''.._._ '-'''-'--'VCl ...... H-> 
same 
as term as seen 
wait until next general ... d~'--... "'-1-'LIIl 
when seats some 
2004, but anecdotally 
look at legislative career 
ambition 
case. 
career 
preliminary 
states 
will 
2005). The impact 
terms 
t"h11rt.P.o:•n states 
has had on the ........ "'"' ... '"'L"' ...... 
partly dependent on the level of state This chapter 
will explore the current on how term limits have the legislative 
of chamber individually 
conducting legislative business as well as ......................... A ..... .., • .., ... relations. 
Legislative Organization and the Impact of Term Limits 
Power Leadership Party ........ "."'""'"'13'-'CJ 
The effect of term limits on 
cross-state """ .............. ..,,..,. 
leadership, caucuses, and committees are .... -v .. LA ............. very differently across state 
legislatures, chief ................. Tll ... 
the chamber (Francis 1985). There is added ..................... ... 
states including the varying term ........... 1"-, .. A • ..,. •:u"·un,h.P·r.o:> 
J.VE,,JI..::IU~I..VJL.::I are ._.....,..._,.._....,. 
'~'lh'"''"lh•,..., there is a ..... ._ ... , .... ._. ... _ • ....., 
versus 
states 
and to ........ 4~""" .............. l ......... ~.._,...,,l" 
members ..... ""......,."'''"'""'" will be .. ""',..... ... '"" ..... if not 
the next election also and 
in Colorado with leaders losing clout to the governor and ....... ;o;.. ....... " .... , ..... 
2004). In Arizona, Berman (2004) attributes leadership to 
the lack control over the caucus. 
With experience and #3V1''\e:>rt·1 c""' c""'''""'r1"' 1'u diminished term limits, scholars 
theorized that a .., .... ~ ....................... would most strongly affect legislative leadership 
including the "training ground" which leaders develop and 1999). 
Inexperienced leaders have not been provided the complex 
rules of governing and but tend to to organize 
effectively (Cain 1996). This is evidenced in Missouri inexperience is affecting 
the leadership's ability to business through ..,.., ............ ,u. ....... ., .... 
weaker deliberations on the floor (Richardson, Valentine, and 
(Moen, Palmer, and Powell 2005) one-term .. :n.~ .... , ............... .. 
favors and the consequence is rank-and-file .. u ..... " .......... ...., ...... don't 
tenure 
term ................... ,.,... 
nf-•'""' 1 '"' short with a vast ................ u,..., two "'"""''"' 1 '""'"'C' or 
pno~mru:Ur"<' and rhf"f"I'>1'"'""'1""11"'PC' 
Mal bin and Benjamin 
high and members term-limited ...... r-,, .......... "" ................ 
leadership because the ............ " ............... .. managing a 
leadership, contrary to the national In saw the tenures of 
speakers rising 
future l~'><:tr1""1'"" COming Up from the rankS, more pf()fe:SS1~0n(ll u.,F,hJ.tU.I.U.t\.n,J are placing 
tnc:reclsea emphasis on members who the caucus 
(Freeman 2004). The path to is now on fundraising ability coupled 
with an advanced selection (Bowser et al. Even in Maine, known more 
as a "citizen legislature," leaders the 
of solely on merit. Whereas ..... ...,,, .... _ ....................... ..... consensus building was a 
prerequisite for ~""'""'·u ... ::u. .... ••Jl to .. .., ...................... u.p, fJ'V'.I..I.> ... .., ....... n•:lrriJP.C'1'1!"1<:lT'IiC'h 1 n now outweighs 
considerations. Committee chairmanships are no 
Palmer, and Powell 2005). 
a to leadership (Moen, 
Scholars find that because of increased leadership in caucus .,.,.,.,...T1''"'""' 
the power and influence of has actually 1 ,.,,... ... .,.-:lC'Ort under term ........... L.1. ....... .......v· ... """~ .. .... 
are spending much more ......... "-A ............... j0., than 
1-HU-n-\t:~r and 
can 
caucus 
......... , .. AU-''"'""' faring worse 
not have as much control over '"""n'""""rl punishment, 
party at 
contested and begins years before the speaker is formally elected. The position also 
been traditionally a one-term speakership with 
legislative and operational procedures. Scholars 
term limited states may soon resemble 
Uhll'-'.l"-"·J.'-''•' and authority over 
suggested that speakerships in 
.~..~.uu.,'-''u et al. but so 
the only case where this is found is Arkansas (Bowser et 2003). 
In order to run for the speakership or in Florida, candidate 
must get a coalition member support and are officially considered speaker-
designate or President-designate once they accumulate a votes the caucus. 
The positions are extremely powerful because leader completely controls the 
1999). 
goes, and whether and how it gets to 
""'"'""'"-............. this power ......... -.... ,, 
...... ,..,.~ ... ~K ........ "' do not rally .... ~ .......... ., ... turnover is 
next '"'"'"''""'-.l'LHI 
It is caucus 
is 
scenes caucus 
that the effect term limits on leadership depends on 
norms and procedures were in term 
who had greater latitude in exercising were 
provided 
leaders. 
Influence of Committee Chairs 
Sarbaugh-Thompson et al. out the meaning of leadership and stress 
there are large differences in the influence of party leaders and committee 
are more apt to name a leader and 
the 
legislative leaders and governor 
level caucus members. 
autonomy over work and 
15 According to the National "'-''UU."-""'""""''.""'""' 
same category 
work, ,.... ................ , ... .. 
terms 
Palmer, and Powell 2005). In 
functions by committee has allowed more poorly crafted nn.I~I"''Ot 
to the floor, instead of being vetted properly in committee 
Sarbaugh-Thompson et al. (2004) find that a 
affects work 
legislation rank -and-file is a loss 
institutional memory and often a duplication of bills. Arizona, legislators with 
previous elective experience prior to arrival at the state legislature are often chosen 
as committee chairs and are perceived to 
process (Berman 2004). 
Leaders are orienting new members more providing increased 
opportunities for leadership (Peery and 2003). Some these include 
committee Carey, Niemi, and Powell (2000b) .:nAp:;,p:;;, .... ,;, .. that despite the loss 
of experience and policy 
be replaced with talent instead 
term-limited legislatures are 
knowledge 
of .. ...., .... , .............. out legislators, committee 
Little 
may now 
a few 
term 
not 
to term 
vou•vu .• :Jv to 
...,.._...,,>_, .... .~."""by melnDe:rs reetect:ton cortsldlerauot1S largely 
diminished, it is""'""" .......... ,.,..,. not surprising that committees have not .., ........ u"'"'"' ..... as 
dramatically as might 
In While 
both party leaders and committee have traditionally been important in the 
decision-making the Senate, party leaders have been strongest force the 
House 1985). When Republicans control of the House in 1997 
session, they created a council system with various committees under each jurisdiction. 
These seven councils replaced the Democratic model of twenty-four standing 
committees the year .._ ........................ 1998). Instead of creating 
committees and subcommittees to member requests as was customary the 
Democratic ...... .u ... "..., ....... 
to ..,.,.,. ..... ,...Tr,,.,. .. 
appropriations allowing each council more authority over policy than 
a separate, more Appropriations Committee. 
Coinciding with term is lack of collegiality the more 
nature 
a 
as as a 
and nr\1,.,.1'"\1'"'t1H1o11"1t:>C are U.U.U.'-""''-" 
...., .......... '"" ..... ,, .. :u. •• IJ"" across party 
on geography or ethnic ....... ,, .................... ...., .... lt:>t:l.f1H"',n-
the legislature. Those new to the legislative nrr•~"""'~co 
party alliances will be fewer and a less collegial body (Sarbaugh-Thompson et al. 
2004). Cain and Kousser (2004) find the legislature has become much more 
partisan, but do not consider it a result of term limits. and Moreno (2002) similarly 
find that the Florida legislature in the was already becoming increasingly 
partisan. of increasing polarization must take national trends into account, 
including those seen at the congressional level when assessing 
Some states have implemented orientation programs for new members to 
provide them with an opportunity to procedures and to know veteran 
legislators, as well as to program in California is entitled 
C.A.P.I.T.O.L. Institute. The training nrr\n-rt:~m includes sessions on the"' ........... ~, . .,..,..,,..,. 
new 
system, budget procedures, resources 
work. Many the legislators find~..., ............ """ to know more extJenlen<::ea 
is the most valuable of a 
..... .._,,.._.. ......... n·rncrrt:~1tTl run by 
caucus 
state 
ll-'rU1I1Ar has concentrated '"""'.., IA«:llrtt:>'f•CMiln 
and caucus ·~·_.~~ ..... ..-.. , 
will T'PTl""'<.l 1ln SO, including VU.<LU.I.'-''-' on t:J(;.':(.;WlJm:;cn.ng and f"1l1:'lrl't"<'ltt"ilni'T 1.4U.l.l..l\..l .. .;.:J of .lVU.'U.V.l.:J• 
Rank-and-file members have a loss institutional memory and 1 nr·rP•Cl!C'Pr1 duplication 
bills and issues. power committees and has waned 
and procedural expertise has dropped. On the of the House, lack procedural 
knowledge necessitates heavy "scripting" by leaders. Lastly, minority party has lost 
influence in passing or amending bills. 
Relationship Between Chambers 
One of the most significant unintended consequences of term is 
marked shift in favor of the more experienced Senate. Most senators have institutional 
knowledge because of their experience as House members. The usually a more 
collegial body, now has more collective experience than the and a greater 
understanding of how the legislative process works, a distinct advantage in 
accomplishing their priorities (Carey, Niemi, and Powell 2000b ). The Senate body 
become the ''repository for the remaining institutional memory the .. ...,J:,,.._.., .. I;A.\.VJLO 
themselves" 
1 
Michigan legislators 
the Senate as one of the most ·~~"'"'.-l'n .... t- ........ JfJ ........ , ................. ._. 
to was the 
realm of policy-making, as well as electoral tensions between term limited members of 
the House challenging incumbent senators (Sarbaugh-Thompson et al. 2004 ). Sessions 
can become more heated when ........ ,_,. ..... .._....., members run against the incumbent for Senate 
seats, sometimes even within their own party (Carey, Niemi, and Powell2000b). The 
Senate to have gained a procedural advantage over the in term-limited 
states due to their levels of ov.-..o11"t-• 
sum, much of the term limits research has provided results pre:cts,el 
because state legislatures have different traditions, norms, that will be 
affected differently with the advent term In the case Florida, leadership 
will likely continue to be powerful strong nature of these positions the 
wants them to be. The work of the .. ..,F,A"'u ......... J,.., has become more difficult due to lack 
of policy and procedural expertise the membership. Control has become 
centralized within the leadership to guide legislative priorities. 
Senate has become more influential because of 
111 
an 
caucus. 
'.n.-n-.....-..t-h"""' chairs will after term ..................... . 
~: Power will shift to the ;:::,ertare h.or•o.nc~a of more PV1"\Pr1Pf1f'P ,.,,.,. ........... .,.,rArl to the 
House. 
Data and Methods 
The primary data source this chapter is personal interview data collected in 
Out of the 11, ten are current or 
former legislators and one is a veteran legislative lobbyist. Those interviewed include 8 
current or former legislative leaders, 3 of whom are former Speakers of the ............ u_,,..,, 
executive branch leaders including a former lieutenant governor, and three former 
legislators turned lobbyists (see Appendix 1 for a comprehensive Approximately 
30 former and current legislative leaders and lobbyists were contacted to schedule in-
person interviews from all around the state. Interviewees were selected based on their 
former experience and current involvement in governmental process to assess 
legislative effects and post -term the .I.VF,,.I.UIH~,_ .... ,, ..... 
.......... , ......... L ...... , ... ...,. Newcomers to the 
with was 
1 
set 
this £'1"'1£l ..... ,..,. ....... "" .. , ........ "" leadership 
as well as a comparison of ............. ""' ........... ,..,..., limits. 
Tenure data and information regarding teQ:tst;arnre . .,.<':)rl,., .. .,.'"' ..... paths is from the 
Florida House The to leadership is established through 
media reports. Quantitative data supplements findings through the 
process. 
Results 
did not 
have a positive effect on the legislative process. Term limits has created a severe lack of 
institutional memory, not just among rank-and-file, but within legislative 
leadership and committee chairs. Many cited that term removed good legislators 
and didn't necessarily make better public policy. However, most agreed that term 
limits did bring blood and a new and a goal 
term limits movement. But most ,...n."""'"rt 
disadvantages. term 
1 
most seen 
However, several L..., ... , .. ,....,"" Republican leaders feel term has not been 
process: 
Lobbyist and Former House Minority Leader Curt (R): I didn't support 
term limits. I didn't think were I thought they were going to be 
bad. The that I got the public was upset at not the state 
legislature. 
Lobbyist and Former House Member Peter Dunbar (R): [Term limits] has made 
several significant changes in optnton, not any them really for the 
The biggest problem all to me is simply because 
they don't the best the people they send out before 
they have an opportunity to give that. 
Former Lieutenant Governor Frank Brogan (R): I have an inherent 
fear term limits are a lazy man's politics ... of is taken 
out some very good people, people who are doing a who would 
continue to do a job. 
While most suggest term 
almost 
are more to 
1 
don't think anyone should 
public servant. 
All agreed the most significant effects of term limits been on legislative 
leadership, particularly in the House. Figures 5.1 show the tenure the 
Speakers of the House and Senate President, respectively. The tenure is noted as the 
number of years of legislative "p""''1 r·P. in that chamber just prior to taking the leadership 
position. Figure 5.1 shows the tenure of speakers beginning in Hyatt 
1998 when 
Republican John Thrasher assumed speakership and was term-limited out 
served 6 years prior to their tenure, it certainly not been the norm in recent decades. 
The majority of speakers had 8 years or more experience in the House assuming 
the speakership. 
shows tenure 
to 
1 
term limited 
due to term tenure over 
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Figure 5.1. Tenure of Florida Speakers from 1978-2004. 
Note: The tenure figure is calculated by how many of a speaker held 
at the during 
and 
1 
traditionally been 
such as 
term 
Wetherell (D): The .,v...,•u.n..vJ. president have probably become more 
powerful the n.,.r·v-1 ""' 0 Jrnf-"rnnll"'r.., is 8 and out so 
you ~·~··•'w•~ had 
Some had to do with leadership's 
candidates open seats to 
1 
to leadership more In fact, 
term limits took Traditionally, a future ov ............. ...., .. 
advance Hodson et al. 
members running for ...,.IJ .. , ...... ,., ...... vote. Although 
speakers and ....,""~.'""""" by caucus a 
year prior to taking the leadership gear from the their 
election plotting a run down the road. Table 1 
progression of speakership races and the .......... ...., ....... ...., when the race was declared in 
the media. This table begins with John second Republican speaker after 
Daniel Webster. Thrasher's run for the OIJ"""n..vJ..:JlU.t.J was much closer to his assuming 
office because Republicans had only over the majority in 1996. It is clear that 
once Republican majorities kept increasing since the 1998 elections, coinciding with 
term limits taking effect 2000, run the speakers hip increased in 
the time between the race essentially 
would be assumed. Much of the 
speakership how contentious race 
designating leaders is 
new to Florida, it is evident 
at the 
are at or 
1 
*Rep. John Thrasher's race 
won the majority of the House after 
**Rep. Tom Feeney's term is non-consecutive in the House. He served the 
House from 1990-1994 when to run Governor in 1994 and won a 
special election to the House in April1996. He was in his third term when he was 
selected speaker-designate. 
***Rep. Marco Rubio was elected in a special election to the House January 2000 
and was in his second full term when he was selected srJe,a .. 1<f'.;r. ~""'''"IJLf"o., .... "~·""· 
aPendleton, Randolph, "Thrasher in Line for Top House Job," Florida Times-Union, 21 
April1997, sec. Metro. 
bGriffin, Mike, "Feeney in Line to be Speaker," Orlando Sentinel, April 1997, sec. 
Insight. 
cCapitol Bureau, "Fall 
Sarasota-Herald Tribune, 
Being Fitted for 2002 House Leadership Robes," 
March 1999, sec. B. 
dBridges, Tyler, "Rep. Cantens Halts Campaign to ~""'"',...nt""'"' House 
Herald, 12 September 2002, sec. B. 
enunkelberger, Lloyd and Gary Fineout, "Lawmaker 
'Wake-up " 'ar·aslna·-ru.~ra,~a 
fGomez, Alan, "Domino Won't 
2005, sec. 
Plans 
it a 
term 
run 
on careers. most recent case 
Kiser: We've seen since term limits the time frame move up faster and 
faster for that freshmen to elect a from their class. This last one 
broke all just in awe guys still don't even 
know in our opinion what these guys are made Are they really speaker 
quality, have you seen them some tough and handled 
it right, have they have they made best statemanslike 
decisions for the state? Who are the people around them that are probably going 
to be their top lieutenants that are also going to play a major role in how 
A. ....................... is governed? 
Dunbar: The one sphere of llU.JlUvJU'-''-' see that term limits upon 
everybody quickly it ele(;tea when the 
process began and now ....,~,................. in right 
now and the quest to grab the .., ....... "' .............. 1--o n.TT,,...car in either House 
is now you can't afford to wait that 20 to that cream or 18 or 
You've got to know before you conclude that you've got 
opportunity so "', ......... , .... ,.,. even elected to the ... ...,r-. ......... ~ .......... 
And you will see today people who they want to the presiding officer 
you know 4 terms going to be and 
gathering ~..~ .. ...,u~ .. .,..:> 
that? 
was 
who spoke off 
disappointment because they were not leadership 
ultimate decision was sentiments: 
Fasano: [T]here are some concerns of having term and I don't mind 
saying that one of them was ... the of Speaker Johnnie Byrd where he 
had little to become fact no opposition and he was 
one only four or people in his With ... 6 some people would 
argue that's not enough time to get enough and and all that 
is needed to be speaker of Florida of Representatives ... It depends on 
the individual. 
Book: Johnnie Byrd became speaker-designate the House 
4 had never on appropriations committee. 
an understanding of workings body. a of term 
limits. He became and it was a .... "'""'" .......... """ 
Frankel: I mean there's something to be about having experience so now 
a it to be a..,~-" .... " ... ""'"" ... served 14, 18 
.. ,. ......................... u .• "" .... before someone had to be of the example. Now 
3rd you can speaker House you term or term ... 
Because of term limitations, there was a group of people who 
would then be in a to be speaker. It used to be very competitive and 
you'd have a wide group particular you a very group ... 
It was slim pickings and guy turned out to a dts;aste~r. 
Some hindered to 
term and 
However, it is 
brought into 
Book: What happens is if 
into the who 
"""' ............... h'"'" and 
Wetherell: 
The race for leadership has also changed within 
Senate norms were to wait until to 
begin before selecting perhaps more 
is 
rresnm<~n probably 
shows the 
His successor, 
..... ....,A,l"'"""' president in 
or 
run 
King won the Senate presidency in December 
Sen. Tom and Dan Webster. made a 
beginning in 2002 with the promise 
senator to serve two as 
no races were prior to 
..... '-' •. lall.'-' r...-"""'n""'"""''" that 
House. 
also 
Jim 
while in a three-way race" .................. .. 
giving the presidency 
.., ......... ~ .......... in 2004 (Saunders 8 
December 2001). Sen. Webster wasn't officially llY.l .. LJJ.\.''"' out of contention after 
the 2002legislative session when the team led by King and successfully won a 
redistricting battle that but ensured !.J'-'··· ...... ..., presidency 
(Bridges March 2002). While is somewhat of an,...,.,.,..,_..~ ....... "" with his run for the 
Senate presidency in only 2 and years in the Senate, one 
concluded his run at leadership 4 years before ""' ............... ~ •• ~". 
second year in the Senate. This was due large I y to 
President King and Senate President-Designate 
Dan Webster for presidency 
years in the House before entering the Senate. to 
leader, Ken Pruitt 
and only 
Senate 
"muscle out'" 
spent 10 
appears to be more contentious than even in the ........................... The race for has 
become 
November 
heated with Sen. 
only to be 
Kennedy 
the ....,...,., ....... ...., ...,.,...o,co•rwa,....r•'" 
,._,.Tll•..llll"' 1"'\r,::I>C'irJPnr••u was truncated oec:aw;e L'VIJ\. .. V.ILO: . ...,\.U&U 
"'·"'·""'""''-··'-'J.I.J...::J and won the majority 
**Sen. Toni Jennings was Senate president for two terms. 
***Sen. Jim King won a special election to the Senate in March 1999. 
**** Sen. Alex Villalobos was "declared" the winner of the Senate presidency race in 
November 2004 the 2009-2010 term. been by Sen. Jeff 
Atwater. 
aBranch, Karen, "Broward Lawmaker Emerges as GOP Senate Pick," Miami Herald, 28 
May 1993, sec. Local. 
bKleindienst, Linda, "Senate Democrats Pick Wexler as Leader," Sun-Sentinel, 12 April 
1995, sec. Local. 
cWallace, Jeremy, "Republicans Pick McKay for Senate President," Bradenton Herald, 
1 May 1999, sec. Front. 
dSaunders, Jim, "King in Senate Throne Republicans Vote to End 
Controversy," Florida Times-Union, 8 December sec. 
eKennedy, John and Bob Mahlburg, 
Orlando Sentinel, June 2002, sec. 
Senators Revive Battle 
& 
Michael, "Pruitt Running Hard for ~entare 
Press Journal, sec. Pruitt had no 
choosing 
of planned out advance However, the 
Feeney: Democrats ... understood that order to get to be speaker there was a 
step-by-step in a long ladder. had to establish some credentials 
on matters. you would, example, if you chose 
education as an area to specialize in you had to establish over a period of 2 or 4 
or 6 years you were credible and capable understanding the 
complicated nuances And you had to move up and show 
you could chair a subcommittee or an important and then eventually 
in order to be speaker you typically had to serve some time 8 or 10 or years 
into service as either chairman or rules chairman or both ... 
What is nowadays is are running before 
develop at all to the extent 
more amongst colleagues 
often are running 
Dunbar: [I]nstead of the process working hard your committee, 
............ Au, ... ,... how to chair your understanding how the 
helping colleagues on the floor move issues ... negotiating 
points of compromise you up coveying 
mentor 
supposedly abolished leadership funds years ago. 
Leadership are not and 
ends 
more term so I'll do it 
to .............. ..,...., ... 
While Democratic races for speakership races built on 
Party, race 
not started out that way: 
Feeney: That sort of factional deal-making is not nearly as important in the 
House today and it certainly hasn't happened over I mean 
Websterffhrasher didn't run as a team. Thrasher/Feeney didn't run as a team. 
Feeney/Byrd didn't run as a team. 
Additionally, the way upcoming legislative leaders are oriented has also changed since 
the Republicans took over the majority of the legislature, particularly the House and 
because of the ever-increasing advanced selection of speaker-designates. The next three 
speaker-designates bundled themselves together as a leadership team (Troxler 
are a part of decision-making : 
Legislators currently in office pointed to term as reason why they were 
not only able to get into the legislature, the opportunity to to 
leadership positions much more 
Fasano: If you didn't have term limits, you could deals being made for 20 
years out of who's going to be the next of the or the next 
president of the Senate. If you didn't have term people whether they be a 
freshman member of the Republican Party or the Democratic Party you know 
they might never make it to a leadership position. . . . what's great about 
term limits, you have that ability to move up ladder very quickly and 
leadership and make a difference before you leave ...., ...... ,, ........... 
Rubio: I think clearly it given an opportunity for a bunch of people to get 
into public that otherwise would not have, example I would 
never have become 4 or 5, 6 years. Maybe that's not necessarily 
accurate but it certainly would have been me to get legislature 
had it not been term no doubt about 
The creation of committee "councils" under Webster the 1996 
"training ground" for new members: 
Thrasher: [T]he major changes we was create ..., ........ u ..... ,.,, ..... VCM:liJ.....,u .. u. 
broad areas of public where we then put 
term were able to 
..,,.,.,.,,., .. aF,"""'"' peGIPle tO 
the term before term limits took term 
Thrasher: [In I had a very a good 1 ""<:~.riP1'"C'n 1!n team to pick from both 
members who I was elected with 6 
ready to do their last two as 
The advantage I had was there were a 
benefit of that. 
Feeney: The simple analogy I like to use as a football is that going from the 
system of no term limits to a term-limited system is an lot comparing 
the system to the system at a college football I mean, you try to 
recruit if you're a college coach at the a couple good 
people who can quarterback or on any given 
year. Some of those people may tum out to be surprises and some may 
tum out not to be leaders at all. you to develop a bench when people 
are their first year, their freshman year and start because 
in 2 or 3 seasons, or terms as the case be, folks are going to be leaders 
at the state level. 
It's this rotation every two years that some point to as hindering the legislative 
process because of the loss of institutional memory: 
Kiser: Some of positions Appropriations and 
Rules in the past where we've 
chairman of Appropriations 
Chairman for 4 or 5 or 6 
as ..,,.A .... A.A.U . .I. .... U, 
chairman. It 1"n<::>V13CO 
~-"""'""'~-"'"'"'• someone has 
a row. They've 
in a row. That stability really 
the draw some those 
but 
can 
somewhat: 
Thrasher: I think the only disadvantage I had my two 
many people were leaving 
be as maybe work as hard or be as 
been continuing on in 
term 
so 
ni-t-1 t-n.nlo in some not to 
had they 
The term following the 2000 election which saw 63 freshmen members of the 
House had the opposite effect on legislator motivations: 
Feeney: They certainly didn't have very high expectations terms of "well 
I've got to pass this bill this year." of folks came in knowing that as 
long as they got reelected would have at least 8 years to pursue their goals, their 
jobs, their most important proposals districts. a lot ways I 
fewer hungry mouths to experienced members that had legitimate 
pressures to get things done now or never than say somebody like John 
[Thrasher]. 
Additionally, controlling the 
presented itself to a 
greater extent in the term limits era: 
Thrasher: I about 
a 
on 
time they grasp process: 
not want to 
to 
floor. Members no 
way 
are out by 
Brogan: You used to the luxury on back bench 
and it as you go, on luxury's not 
anymore. You've now got this awesome responsibility to learn that process 
much more quickly from you Tallahassee than you did before. 
The bulk of them about the really beginning to understand 
this whole picture on how all the state government works and should work 
together in last term. And while good that at that 
they've got all these now behind them that are in the stages they 
were when they came in where they don't understand all that 
Dunbar: Members don't learn rules the way they once did and that also 
contributes to your inability to at times. I think when I served I 
could look around House and I could see well almost always amongst senior 
members probably two terms or longer of spheres influence and 
could a skill set 
Debate on floor become less important in deciding votes on legislation: 
Margolis: [T]here's debate, p.''"'''""t·tun is worked out... part 
group that works out things ..,.~,, ..... ~,... ............. is worked out well 
1 
me as 
discussion on 
knowledge. That's something you 
up the debate the r.f3C' 11"\I"'\n,C't 
This has come to a great disadvantage to 
especially in the House: 
minority party 
Frankel: When you're in the minority like we were so significantly, you're just 
making .. Probably the reason you would see a minority getting 
less done is because so much of is based on relationships ... 
you've been the legislature with a Republican 10 or a 
friend and probably in leadership, you've somebody who you can go 
to help you get some of your When you're coming in and you're a 
rookie, a rookie Democrat, who is relationship with? You have a 
relationship with nobody. And it's you to anything done. 
Dunbar: I think never a 
of the out the door. 
minority party is institutionally 
at a disadvantage: 
Kiser: 
to 
so I 
on 
are not going to vote 
5.3 shows 
the average tenure of committee on 
House and Senate. committees include appropriations, ways and means, and 
rules16• In the House both and 1994 when 
position. Republicans took over the 
House in 1996, the median tenure decreases to 4 
1998, the 
limited out following election cycle. With advent of term limits in 2000, the 
median tenure of these committee 
The median tenures in 
senators 
1992 
1994 
1996 
1998 
2000 
2002 
2004 
Republicans 
6.44 
9.02 
4.67 
3.64 
4.60 
over a 
8.57 
8.44 
5.14 
4.00 
4.25 
committees standing appropriations, tax, and procedural as 
well as appropriations and rules u ......... ,...,v,, .. u .... J.~.u.-v .................... . 
experience within the Senate chamber is somewhat the longer term 
at 
in the system: 
because you'd been 
mean you had 
there 2,4,6 and got 
an appropriations ........................... . 
Then you people 
for 4-6 years 
You don't have 
Kiser: So it's the things that I saw that were not good 
a committee particularly on tough issues whether it just be 
handling the committee and making sure that all the 1 n"lnn1rt<:l'"'~" .~. ... ,]:::..~.c,.~.,.~.~ ..... v .. .~. 
heard early making sure that is nrs:~•n<:~ 1r""r1 
I 
legislation is done in a timely fashion so when you to committee you've 
got all answers, you've got all amendments things that to done, 
things that you to avoid just making sure 
smoothly that people that 
is used that catcn<:~s on to that real fast and we've 
seen now ""' ................. , ....... , ... ,..., ..... , ............ , ............. .. l"'flT"nT'Yli1'tt.t:•-"" and 
didn't know how to run the ......................... ,1 .-t-"''"" 
even what 
Because of term limits, each now the need to acquire power dole out 
the top committee assignments leading to rotation every two years. This 
institutional knowledge can also translate itself into particularly in 
committees: 
Dunbar: How am I going to understand how ... [Democrats] ""_. .... ..,,.." .... ..u.., ... 
something I'm not sitting the table to 
understanding it and then 
and 
tenn causes 
not as as the Senate. one senator 
Fasano: [F]or my Senate we already 
had experience ""''l.&'l.£""'"u .... '"''•• about how 
everything runs around our 
before we understood the whole process so you 
Margolis: In the Senate people work well because there's only 40 
people and you have to keep going back to same people so it works 
very well... who knows the and if you haven't it you 
haven't seen it you don't know exactly what's going to transpire and you have to 
know how to do things. It's as simple as that. a kind of process 
now. 
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1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 
1--e--House 10 10 4 8 6 4 4 
I· • • Senate 14 12 18 8 6 8 9 
is 
total number 
more 
Now, the that many Senate members have previous 
Relationship Between 
There has been a marked 
has made the difference 
Frankel: The Senate's always 
obviously because of term 
anybody the House 
they were someone like me who came 
people who may 8 
be in the ...., ..... , .............. . 
the ............ j • ._ .. ..., 
Fasano: 
Chambers 
"'"'""•"""''-~ ......................... body but now 
case... don't have 
more than 8 
will 
atone 
·nr<:lch.c•r· I think you'll see few ntll.n.nl&> ..... "" ............. ... 
Senate that not probably served in 
a feeling of superionty I think terms 
we were 
that but at the of the day I still think House is '"'"""'..., ......... ;:;.. 
capable people ... the good thing about the House is got so 
members that always going to some who have more than 
others where in Senate all of the same. 
Sessions have become combative in years following the implementation of term ............ l.L ..... , 
including the session 
legislative sessions of 2001 2002 were 
extremely contentious between the House Speaker Tom Feeney Senate President 
John McKay. Feeney explains his leadership during time as follows: 
Feeney: In the Senate about more than of the members to have 
legislative from House. So you have a fairly deep pool of 
members that are well-experienced... I had 63 of who were 
freshmen when I was speaker the House. was important for me as a 
House member, jealous House prerogatives that we not be advantage of 
or were run over by a more group senators at 
Rubio: The state Senate is still a reflection 
don't mean as a just as an 
where all the former state reo,res:en1tattves 
it was like. 
breakdowns are really a function of individual .. .., ......... .., ........ 
create a scenario that 
enough to 
prayers over without having .. ..., ............ ,,..., 
somewhat tunnel-vision 
Part of the acrimony in recent may to the lack of personal relationships 
formed over Legislative leaders no longer have a strong base from which to work 
Thrasher: The Senate ore:staent 
time I became speaker 
know a lot of times 
way things, 
kind of to the top 
a 
to more 
nature: 
processes, 
Thrasher: I think that you sense it from the probably always 
there's a little more deliberation down in the and everybody is an 
island to themselves and are not bound by leadership as much as the House is 
and those 
The smaller size of the Senate body lends itself to more individual influence, even 
across party lines: 
Fasano: In the Senate, because there's 40 of us you so much more impact 
on decision-making, on policy-making ... Over here not even close to 
as partisan as it is over the House and the Senate is not and no need for 
it and 40 going to meet up with person who you may 
have voted committee somewhere along the road where in 
the House that's not going to happen as 
Book: The Senate will always have somewhat of an advantage over House. 
you manage 40 people versus 120 people going to have an 
advantage. When you a more collegial body if you will which is what you 
get out of the Senate, the politics just change . 
It appears that while .......... " ....... ,._, already enjoys an institutional advantage over 
the House, the experience levels Senate members comparison to House Lt. ......... _.._..,...,._ 
further advantages more collegial 
body, senators House 
more 
benefit. 
Conclusions 
Term limits has significantly impacted leadership from how they are selected to 
how they operate and control caucus This is particularly 
evident the House where leadership has been most profoundly .......... ..., ....... ...., ...... Power has 
been centralized within the speaker and Senate presidency, even more so than in the 
While the speakership and ...... ..., .. , ........ ..., presidency Florida have traditionally been 
\ 
very powerful positions, they have become even more so with the vast amount 
inexperienced members who to look to leadership Centralization of 
hands up-and-coming leaders. The run for 
advent of term limits. 
Freshmen members are running for the top post as soon as they win first election. 
trickles down to 
to a 
members 
procedures, and 
to more contention between 
a 
own political ambitions. 
term limits have been significant the way 
INTRA-AND 
limits was promoted as a to 
to "'1 1-17""'" legislators who would presumably 
sought to 
to 
on the legislative process, as it to congress and the of 
special money and had become synonymous with in 
Washington. This spilled over to the state legislatures as well and the of 
long-time incumbents """"''"1 ..,,.,. up to lobbyists and an !nrlld·tt,.r.oln""""' towards 
constituency. But when there is an influx of ""V?,,.rt,..,.,.,,,.,., legislators, who then the 
void in the power vacuum by term VIAU.IJO.V.L will the 
influence of staff, branch, and iT'IT•"'r""·"T groups on process 
a post-term limits era. 
Intra-Governmental Influences 
leaders and favor of that one 
way .I.VJ:;.J...:OU.JU,.J. responded to 
policy procedures is to 1 "r·rP·:li~P 
as most important resource 
over was 
as as 
is ...... H.lUA'"'''-'"-""''""' to 
l"'f"H"nn<Jor,p.rl to non-term ->.J.AJ.J.A'-""'''"" states 
(Carey, and much 
of the 1'"0£"'"'"'-rr•h and nr;::>n<:lr<:lt1 a 
legislature (Moen, Palmer, and Powell 2005). 
This finding is not uniform across .._ .................. , ..... states, however. In Michigan 
for,....,.,.,.,... . , oec;Isx~ons (Sarbaugh-Thompson et 
al. 2004). In Ohio, the turnover of legislators has coincided with turnover of 
especially partisan staff (Farmer and Little 2004). Some of the turnover may have to do 
with funding cuts as seen in Michigan (Sarbaugh-Thompson et al. 2004) and California 
(Cain and Kousser 2004). 
Florida has one the highest amounts of staff to legislator ratio the 
at 11.9 (Kousser 2005). Legislators are allotted resources for both the Tallahassee 
and district offices. Staff Florida has traditionally powerful due to policy 
expertise in key areas and their considerable knowledge of the legislative....,.._...,.,..,,..,..,,...,. 
Senate staffers have been somewhat less partisan House staff turnover levels 
much higher in the House (Colburn 
but tempered with 
policy and " .... '"'J(' .. A'.,";!,.'J.., .... r ... • ... • ...... "".~" .. ":-,.'""'-~1'1'.,!~-· as 
Opponents of term limits C'Hnrrroc•t"orl term 
lobbyists would a ...... ._ ............... .. that was sure to come If '""n'1 "' 1 <:l.,.1 ' 
power weakened, the job a lobbyist would prove to be more a· .. r..:Y..::P.......... Without 
term relationships, lobbyists would need to "votes on individual pieces of 
legislation ... retail rather than wholesale." Capell interest groups 
would actually become more involved candidate recruitment and campaigning to fill 
voids left by weakened party leadership. Additionally, Capell su~:~ests that lobbyists 
will spend more time explaining the process than before. 
Lobbyists in term-limited states see the loss knowledge to be most profound 
in more professional legislatures (Moncrief and Thompson 2001). Because of this 
lobbyists are changing the way they in process. Lobbyists report spending 
more time on creating coalitions and communicating with legislators (Thompson and 
Moncrief 2003). This has also been the case Ohio (Farmer and While it 
is 
resources 
sooner most 
Stokes 
their money in a £'<:11"1nn<:li n-n 
important factor to use as a 
committee assignments are much 
become an 
power chamber when things such as 
certain (Gordon and 2003). 
Much of this literature on the impact of term limits on .......... .., ... ...,,..., .. groups cannot be 
generalized due to differences in state culture, formal campaign finance laws, 
and level of professionalization {Thompson and ..... _._ .... , ... ...,J ........ JL 2003). While Niemi, 
and Powell (2000b) find no systematic differences ... ~ ... JLUVJlll..., ..... of lobbyists in term-
limited versus non-term limited .............. ...,u ..... suggest lobbyists 
have too much power over the newcomers, bills back years later 
when there is little institutional memory (Berman 2004 ). Sarbaugh~ Thompson et al. 
(2004) find that legislators Michigan are relying much more on lobbyists to help 
make key policy decisions. In California, are using lobbyists to draw up 
more legislation than before term (Cain and 2004). The work of 
lobbyists has changed with term limits, with much more time spent building 
relationships, communicating with legislators, and involvement campaigns and 
fundraising. Whether by 
term advantaged resources to 
to 
most 
rft»C'T\T"&"<::lrf .ot-i-£:u-.•f-£' of term ,,_.,._ .. , ..... .._..,. 
l•m·•v-a.--~ with non-term .................. , ..... 
(1998) found the strongest effect to be term 
limits. Michigan, the governor is most influential actor in 
legislative process primarily because agenda (Sarbaugh-
Thompson et 2004). The governor can more centralize policy-making power. 
The governor is at a particular advantage because of the availability of information and 
expertise within state executive branch and bureaucracy at the governor's disposal 
(Carey, Niemi, and Powell 2000b ). In Maine, legislative members enter the legislature 
with a lack of knowledge on complex The branch takes the lead on 
policy and has given governor the upper-hand despite the fact that the governor 
faces term as well (Moen, Palmer, and Powell 2005). 
Cain (1996) predicted that term limits would most profoundly alter the balance 
of power between the legislative and branches where competition exists. 
Much of this, he points out, however, depends upon the formal constitutional powers 
granted to the governor. Further, term limits disadvantages professional 
legislatures even more due to 
Niemi, and Powell 2000b ). 
resources comparable to governor 
bargain 
seen resources 
to 
of building ....,'V'._., ......... ...,.u_, 
governors have gained influence "1 rn,n• .. , ...,...., ... , ......... ~..,they have gained trust legislative 
members (Straayer 2003). However, the influence governor be varied, 
depending on of the has in public and the 
experience of other political actors the process (Sarbaugh-Thompson et al. 2004). 
Finally, Niemi, and (2000b) suggest that the may remain 
limited legislators seeking to stay in public life. The governor has become one of the 
process because of term limits. While most 
governors are term limited, the resources available to them through the executive 
branch provide 
bargaining ability. 
In sum, influence 
making. 
knowledge of the ""'"';:;_"'' ...... , ..... become more 
important to newly elected members institutional rna, .......... ,...,., 
knowledge, including "~-"""~ .... .,. ....... ...,F,, .. ~ ................ J.U turned lobbyists. 
changed 
H1: Legislators 
term limits. 
Hypotheses 
more on staff to navigate Tnr,nncrn post-
Hz: Lobbyists will be more influential as important sources of information to 
legislators. 
H3: Lobbyists will alter they way they lobby legJLSlators 
staff. 
increasingly lobby 
H4: The governor will gain influence over the legislative process post-term 
limits. 
Data and Methods 
Data for this chapter is both and qualitative. turnover levels 
have been provided by the Florida Legislature of Human Resources to determine 
staff have remained constant or are turning over just like members are turning over. 
Secondly, this chapter will also look at type permanent 
legislature. Looking at influence of groups, the number 
legislators who are lobbyists will also be assess.ea. 
veto power be used to 
in the previous roh~l ..... ~<:>r 
TnPTni"aPr~ .<3VC•,...ni·•·u.,. branch 
governor, and on 
process are a hot commodity in the world of .. ....,&..._..., .. '"'."'" 
both institutional memory and ..., ....... .n ........ 
legislators had a greater to them through the often 
complicated process of legislating: 
to learn and I think by virtue of that fact, 
coupled a turnover people (because what term limits was 
created to do), the people who are constant are not only the 
issues, know the process better than most anybody that is elected to public 
office in Tallahassee ... the people who are there most of whom were 
there before term and are there still and will when the next 
of come in, of hand and 
therefore they have become more important to the not less .. ,L ...... ..,v .......... ,, ... 
Frankel: I think the staff is probably much more influential because members 
don't know what they're 
Dunbar: becomes more powerful ............. , ........ ,JI .... they 
do understand the protocols of how to move 
appropriate the things 
of the process- they've ...................... .. 
.. ...,. ... ,,..,..,,. . ...,. the if 
more to say than ..., ... ....,...., ... "'.u .., ......... , .............. 
VT'I£"\'\liliPI'il'I"P and v.l'-'·'l.,d.\..'U 'V'JLA.A,.,..L~.LU 
2500 
..,..,. ....... 
2000 ....,.' ............ / ....... 
1500 
///~ 
/ 
1000 
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1111-
------------------------------ ---
-
--- .. 
0 
1979 1988 1996 2003 
...........,. Permanent Staff 1095 1581 1896 1650 
- -11- - Session-Only Staff 240 193 277 153 
--e- Total Staff During Session 1335 1774 2173 1803 
Figure 6.1. Size of Florida Legislative Staff. 
Note: Data source from the National Conference of State Legislatures. 
Figure 6.1 shows the growth and decline in the size of legislative staff in Florida 
between 1979 and 2003. While temporary session-only staff size has remained 
relatively the same, the of permanent staff has grown considerably over this period 
to just under 1,900 staff in 1996 before the Republicans took over the House. In 2003, 
the size of staff has gone down to 1,650, primarily because of streamlining under the 
Republican majorities. While the size of permanent staff has grown over time, there has 
been an increase in the amount of staff turnover since term were first 
implemented in 1992. Figure 6.2 shows the total turnover permanent both 
Figure 6.2. Permanent Partisan and Non-Partisan Staff Turnover Figures, 1993-2005. 
Note: Data provided by the Florida Legislature, Human Resources. 
partisan and non-partisan, and the number of members' between 1993 and 200517• 
Turnover increases over the 1990s in stei_J with the Republican 
1994 and the House in 1996. Particularly is a sharp up 
tick in the amount of turnover these professional most evident 1998. The 
amount of turnover remains relatively high comparison to the 1990s. Much 
legislator selects both district their 
offices. 
exception 2003, are found the "-"LLA.""'"" .... 
While at turnover 
The is 
or both. 
too heavily on 
staff to make decisions and guide through the learning 
process first-hand: 
out the options, the advantages, the disadvantages, Feeney: Staff ought to 
ought to talk to about the of what's and succeeded 
and what's and but ultimately, policy making should done by 
elected representatives. 
Dunbar: The system is cr.P.'l,rt»rl an amendment process, 
amendments and things that nature because people never up that skill set. 
" 11 ""·rn~"-•"" ... "' don't the way once did that also contributes to 
your inability to be effective at .. But" how do you accomplish your 
objective? You don't they way you once did so staff has 
Rubio: I 
limits; 
Margolis: If you don't ,,., .. u ... ..., .. ,, .......... ..... 
build then 
an 
one senator 
a companion. But 
The type of 
Wetherell: The staff become more political appointments at all levels. 
Margolis: [Lobbyists] always and gamer a relationship with and 
chairmen of committees ... They try and recommendations on who should 
be on the committee ... and they spend a lot time lobbying which didn't 
happen before. staff became 
This data shows that is more heavily on process knowledge 
and to some extent the decision-making process. Personal staff becomes 
much more valuable to members in some cases as . Many expressed 
making up to staff 
proponents had hoped. 
There is a greater 
themselves to work through 
House 1994-2002 Executive Office of the 
Governor 
House 1992-2000 
House 1996-2000 Florida Association of 
Homes for the 
Rudolph K. Bradley House 1994-2000 Public Service 
Commission 
John Carassas (R) House 2000-2003 
Lawrence D. Crow (R) House 1994-2002 
Gregory A. Gay (R) House 1992-2000 
John A. Jr. (R) House/Senate 1980-2000 
Carole A. Green House 1998-2004 of Elder 
Affairs 
Chris Hart, IV (R) House 1998-2002 Independent 
Betty Holzendorf (D) House/Senate 1988-2002 
James "Jim" W. Senate; *Comm. of Edu. 1994-2001 
Horne(R) 2001-2004 
Louis House 1994-2002 Independent 
Maygarden (R) 
Melvin (R) House 1968-2002 Independent 
Richard P. Mitchell (D) Senate 1998-2002 
Luis E. Rojas (R) House 1988-2000 Duane Morris LLP 
James A. Scott Senate 1976-2000 Scott 
*Pres. 1994-1996 
Ronald A. Silver (D) House/Senate 1978-2002 Independent 
John E. Thrasher House 1992-2000 Southern Group 
1998-2000 
Carlos L. Valdes House 1988-2000 Trade and Transport 
Council 
Joe Allen House 1976-1986 Independent 
J. Keith Arnold (D) House 1982-1998 
Dick J. Batchelor (D) House 1974-1982 
Samuel P. Bell House 1974-1988 Law Firm 
BobbyL. House 1978-1986 Shutts and Bowen LLP 
Brantley, Sr. (R) Lieu. Gov. 1987-1991 
James K. Brodie (R) House 1980-1982 of Veterans~ 
Affairs 
Scott W. Clemons (D) House 1990-1998 
Linda C. Cox House 1976-1982 
John R. Culbreath (D) House 1967-1978 
Talbot D' Alemberte House 1966-1972 
House 1989-1994 PA 
House/Senate 1978-1990 
House/Senate 1982-1998 
Peter M. Dunbar House 1978-1988 
Pat C. Frank (D) House/Senate 1976-1988 
of Court 
H. Raben, Jr. House 1972-1982 
1980-1982 
House 1966-1974 
Don Hazelton House 1970-1978 
S. Curtis Kiser House/Senate 1972-1994 Holland and LLP 
DexterW. House/Senate 1980-1988 
Lehtinen 
Elvin L. House 1966-1997 Office of the State 
Jr. (D) 
H. Lee Moffitt (D) House 1974-1984 
1982-1984 
Luis C. Morse (R) House 1984-1998 Independent 
Sandra B. Mortham House 1986-1994 
*Sec. of State 1995-1999 
Carl Ogden (D) House 1968-1988 Independent 
R. Dale Patchett (R) House 1976-1990 
Ken Plante (R) Senate 1967-1978 Independent 
Van B. Poole (R) House/Senate 1970-1982 
Debra A. Prewitt (D) House 1994-1998 Independent 
Robert R. Reynolds (D) House 1978-1984 Independent 
Barry S. Richard House 1974-1978 Greenberg Traurig 
RonaldR. House 1972-1984 
Richmond 
Ramon Z. Safley (R) House 1988-1998 Pennington Law Firm 
Dixie N. Sansom (R) House 1984-1992 Canaveral Port Authority 
George H. Sheldon (D) House 1974-1982 St. Thomas 
School of Law 
Arthur M. Simon (D) House 1982-1994 Independent 
Tom Slade (D/R) House/Senate 1962-1963; Independent 
1966-1970 
Charles R. Smith (D) House 1978-1992 
James Harrison "Jim" House 1978-1982 
Smith, Jr. (R) 
LawrenceJ. Smith House 1978-1982 Independent 
(D) *U.S. House 1983-1992 
James Harold Thompson House 1974-1986 
(D) *Speaker 1984-1986 
Karen Lee Thurman Senate 1982-1993 
*U.S. House 1992-2003 
Jim K. Tillman (R) House 1967-1974 
Jack N. Tobin (D) House 1982-1998 
Robert D. Trammell (D) House 1986-1996 
Donald L. Tucker House 1966-1978 
1974-1978 
James L. "Jim" Watt (R) House 1978-1986 Caldwell and Pacetti 
Thomas K ... T.K. House 1980-1992 Florida State 
two 
Those that term 
The party 
both chambers and that is 
lobbyists. In contrast, legislative office to 29 are 
Democrats- former members the that held majorities both chambers for 
almost all the 20th century. 
Of all former legislators, 47 (67. are independent lobbyists who on the 
whole represent numerous clients. Twelve are members large including 
Pennington Law Firm which employs 3 former legislators, 2 of which are shareholders-
Sam Bell (D) and Peter Dunbar (R}. Nine work 
executive branch positions at the state 
includes 6 former speakers of the House and 1 ....,..., .......... ...., president, as well as 2 former 
secretaries of a former commissioner education, and one former lieutenant 
are 
elected legislators because their longevity 
Book: But to some extent the ",.....,u.,..,. 
myself who 
institutional •r .... "''"''"' ..... 
to 
this 
former legislators valuable 
many lobbyists that have 
long 
before term limits 
it is not just in the world of lobbying 
Dunbar: 
broader "".n''A'"'·~'"''' 
on to....,, .............. _. ... are leaving the 
legislature to enter 
Lobbyists say individual A...,F,, ........................ ._. .. are as IP>'lr,.,...-co ............... AL .... "'"'"""'""' -rv'"""-rv'h""·rc-
representing special .u.u .• .., ................ . 
to help teach 
people. 
to 
Dunbar: It's [term limits] people me significantly in my current 
role in private sector. I now can create a relationship on process 
with someone who has not nobody in the process to 
mentor them because they're in a good lobbyist is 
that .,... ...... ,.,..,.,.,.. ... 
~,'"',~,'iA,"I,'-Il•"JlUiJ with a legislator where they 
that was their go-to 
It's a very quick now. to and 
you've the right guy or woman, but you don't have 
used to, you could on to a bill, 
budget. 
Rubio: The '-''-''U'IJLV 
because they don't 
fact term 
The change 
Brogan: You can no longer just lobby 
issue will move forward. to 
3 you 
decisions on their behalf: 
"'~-"''"""' ........... interest 
lobbyists... more way which is a 
concern mine and a concern elected 
official should be that ru::>ro••C'•r, .... 
Thrasher: Well everybody that because people have 
that lobbyists and to 
really want to 
a 
on 
sum, 
trust and the access to mP.rn h•P.rC' of 
decision-making extent l'AT'nn'll1tt;::•p. 
an impact on the .. ..,1.-> ............... ... 
process post-term limits with a continued influx new and inexperienced members. 
Governor 
Term limits took effect Florida in 2000 and has not yet seen a change in the 
governor's office making it difficult to accurately assess what effect term limits have 
had on the power of the governor. But all of 
has been one of the strongest governors in 
interviewees agreed that Bush 
state history, partly due to the lack of 
experience in the legislative body created by term limits during most of tenure. 
When the governor was elected in 1998, the Republicans had held a majority 
House of Representatives election cycle previous and increased ranks 
following the 1998 ...., .. ...., . ...," ..... ,.. thanks part to the coattails. 
in the Senate had 1994. This created an unprecedented unified 
Republican government and Bush a powerful and 
after the 
a speaker to your agenda ~-"'""'"·"'"''"'-£• 
governor, we were on same page most 
running mate in 1994 I have had a much ...... u., ....... " • .., ...... 
governor who's goals were or mutually ""'"-'"'""u. .. :u 
who wanted to undermine me would 
or things. veto not 
operated but a lot of that was because we were on the same page 
time. 
Things were much more combative with the .......... : .............. in the 2001-2002 sessions. The 
Senate with a more experienced body has challenged the governor more in recent years: 
Rubio: Jeb Bush is an extraordinarily gifted imposing individual, intellectually 
imposing and who had a vision in Tallahassee and a vision of what 
wanted to accomplish. That made him very to ............ ,u .... ,..., ... 
~~-'"" ... '"'A;;;;,.A, ........ ~ the that had run four had been the de facto 
ideological leader was even 
elected governor. That's not going to be the case with the next governor. 
Traditionally, governors are not powerful. The much 
more powerful. I you'll see pendulum swing a little bit 
towards that. 
controlled the 
just a tool 
Bush's election we 
become ......... ... ,. ... fO .. ,..., .. 
a much more corr.'"l.nt't"j011" ,...,.,,"" .. t··''"" hr~1nl"n 
nor•..-. ..... ,.,. much more ruuu•<""-'' 
I 
been particularly acute the House and 
become less so in Senate recent 
He's put more power 
with the House I mean if says " the House "' Jeb 
House says " And the Senate try as it might with some pretty good and in 
their own right strong people they've rolled over the and 
it's usually a question of 
Jeb and the House want is how will the .:)eiJlaLe 
Not that will stop it but, how much will the up giving him 
out of it. So to that extent the been very dominant and the 
legislature has been much weaker as an institution the under his 
term. 
Wetherell: The Senate has a more inclined to challenge the 
governor. But still they've acquiesced pretty much to what he The 
House has totally 
The former Lieutenant Governor under Gov. Bush, Frank Brogan pointed to the 
inherent authority the governor's office in shaping public and that should 
be no surprise that Gov. Bush has authority and run with 
by governor over a 
effects in California. He hypothesized that 
the veto power post-term 
likely to give to the 
because the 1 n.c•vn • .ar1.a"''""""rl .. ....,;;, .. ..::~ ............ u. 
demands. no 
to 
would be more 
pattern to 
support or reject this argument, but does show extremes in the use of the veto 
lowest number of vetoes over almost a 
the implementation of term limits show 
6.2 shows, there is no distinct pattern 
effect the governor had the second 
period. However, the sessions following 
vetoes. As Table 
1 "~""1"~"><:1•" 111'" gubernatorial power per se, but it 
does follow the same trend that Clucas (2003) finds. Gov. Jeb Bush, with a unified 
legislature in 2000, the session just prior to term November, 
.. u .......... .., ....... _ ..... the second veto percentage over the from 
However? the percentage vetoed bills increases 2000. In contrast, in 2005, Bush 
exercised the highest veto rate over the number 
item vetoes of general UIJI-'A'VJJ.LJ.UI.J •••. n~...::~ bills has also"~ .......... ,...,~."'"" ...... tenure 
has exercised the ntnrnP•C'T T>'"-.v>h.a.,. 
In are no vetoes in veto is not a 
0 
0 
0 
3 0 
1987 Divided 0 
1988 0 
1989 Divided 0 
1990 Divided 18 0 
1991 Unified 18 4.00 2 
1992 6.86 2 
1993 Divided 16 1 
1994 1 
1995 Divided 1 
1996 Divided 1 
1997 Divided 16 4.00 1 
1998 Divided 17 3.10 3 
1999 10 2.01 3 
2000 Unified 7 1.40 5 
2001 Unified 15 3.80 4 
2002 16 1 
2003 1 
2004 3 
2005 4 
Note: Data provided by the Florida Office of Legislative 
aLegislative year includes regular calendar 
~ills include general and local bills. 
proxy for political power, it does appear that the governor is more willing to wield the 
veto post-term limits. 
2006 elections will pale 
Fasano: Truly, 
but it took a of years have to work with 
members, 160 all together. But you 
compromises, with 
with an end game. You know an end 
happen It has to done with ... ..., ......... ..., ............. p. 
freshman member and say is what I want to do. 
the president of the the 
team and say work out the u. ....... .., ............... ....,"' 
product. So the governor I think it took 
reason why? Well, governor never 
Whereas as many our 
Senate or in some elected ..... ...-..,·~··£·,..,. 
Much of the influence the governor will depend upon personality and political and 
legislative experience in dealing with legislative body post-term limits as well as the 
of the governor. It is an advantage negotiations with 
the legislature, particularly if leadership is lock-step with his agenda and more 
combative if it is not. This is most clearly seen with 
body is more willing to on governor, but even 
It is 
as sources of information in some cases as 
been relatively high the legislature to Many 
of these positions are personal staff to newly elected members. However, data on the 
exact classification of a position is only detail from 2000 on which 
makes comparison difficult with What the data show is that 
members bring along trusted "advisors" to their ................... ""' .. and Capitol ...,._4. ............ . 
Additionally, some 
the Senate body who 
these staff may be linked with former House members elected to 
the to the other chamber them. Future research 
may find that turnover may not be additions new people to the ....... r.,....,..=-co but 
shifting of positions. 
a 
Lobbyists continue to be important players the legislative 
limits, not only for campaign funding they provide, but also as 
post-term 
in the policy-
making process. Many influential lobbyists were .._....,,~.,,_._._ .... ._ ._....,f'. ................ ....,_ .. ....,. .. , .. ,..., .... , ......... .. not 
only understand how but also what the legislator 
sector of lobbying appear to 
,...r .. .,...r.'lr1<~nn to 
round of term 
more 
priorities. Some of 
among the Republican 
seen an 
................. & ... h'-' point to the more tne~xoenenc;ea .......... , .... ".""'' ""'=""'""'""' "'' .. 
who usually agree with the n-n"'""rt''n.-' 
his lead on most issues. In comparison, the more experienced Senate body not 
demands like the House. However, 
term limits, the power the governor also lies person 
the issue of 
the governor's 
office. Many suggested that the new governor to take in 2006 will not hold 
the same power as Bush had over the legislative process. It will interesting to 
see if a new governor will continue to wield """'j;;,.""""'.'"" power or if the legislature will 
to come. assume more of authority in 
Overall, the influences of institutional actors the of lobbyists, and 
the governor have all .... H·'""""'' ... "''"'''""' under term consistent with findings other term 
limited states. This trend likely to ........................... with new legislators 
entering the process. 
CONCLUSION 
In state voters 
Florida overwhelmingly passed term limits the 1990s 
and the early 2000s witnessed significant changes in ......... ..-.r•·· state politics: the .:)ertate 
Jeb Bush was the Reconstruction; and passage and 
. implementation of term limits state legislators. These impacts on Florida politics 
cannot be understated and any study looking at term limits in Florida must these 
changes into account. This study has several effects of term limits on Florida's 
state legislature. The following is a summary of findings of study. 
Chapter 2 examined electoral term limits over the period of 1992 
through 2004. Electoral competition appears to be most pronounced in 2000 when term 
limits first Open seats are often hotly races, particularly this 
era of term limits with incumbents winning reelection by margins. Quality 
challengers are likely to wait until a seat opens up within a ..... ..., ............ ..., amount 
than challenge a term incumbent. only created .F. .... , ....... ., ... 
competition when those seats are the amount of 
open seats and consequently the competition and is not a constant. 
most "''"·nor> 
...,...,,, ..... v ........... , ..... to challengers. 
seats and fn1"'•11...,..\n.ontC' "lrY\S'll'C'1nn nr.o•S'lf't:~ .. war ...., ................. . 
a 
not 
a seat 
aetnogra.phJLC r"l'"l':llnn""" U\.\.JLAV'I.A'-'-'...._ to term 
term 
law took 
increased over number of women 
nominally AU-""-"'"'"""'"""'~ and likely with .... nii1T1r"O 
open seats. In .................... ,..., ••. more ...., ............. , ............. "' are being 
recruited and supported by the political v ......... ....,"' ...... ...., ... ..., .. , .... by the increase in 
more success winning seats 
traditionally held by 
only able to,. ... , ...... ,. .... , ...... ,, ... a certain number seats ,..,..,,..,. ..... T .. , .....,...,.,.....,~ .. .-,, rt•""'.-~£'0,,..,. where 
they have the most success. .,.1- .............. 1-•u with 
party affiliation may actually be a function district 
than simply term 
Chapter4 on the career term the 
direction once out 
are not as term Many 
previous a 
to body is 
of 
over 
term are 
an 
as well as the ..., .......... r-.,u•r-. 
significant change has been 
President. Freshmen members have 
to as 
most 
leadership during their 
terms. The limited number of ... H.""'"'"''"'"' for "'IJ"''"''""'"''- the election post-term 
limits in 2002 brought about a 1 eadershi p in 
leadership are being made sometimes withput regard as to how.., ...... .,.,., .... they will 
perform as leaders. Power been even further f"P1'\tr<:1• 11 within the legislative 
leadership in both chambers. Legislators with little ""v"'"""""" ... ~"" look to leadership 
and committee chairs are even more beholden to leadership and to toe the line on 
KeJlawons ...,..,.1 •• "'., • .,. ..... the House and issues important to 
advantage in procedural 
knowledge. 
Chapter 6 shows the impact of intra- and inter-governmental actors the 
legislative process; namely, staff, lobbyists, and the 
influence over the legislative process, .... _...., ....... _, ......... "" along. 
Many ... "" ......... ., ......... r-. ................ ..., ....... forced from oec:aw;e of term Ant·pr;:o•rt the 
world of lobbying 
procedural 
o.o.~•u.L,,.., ......... sources of funding races. 
more to 
that term 
Future Research Questions 
One element for future consideration is how term 
legislators do their work. .LI'"'''"'"'....,"""' .. ..., ... , ............... ...., ... .... 
not 
U.J.J.\J'Io.d ..... ,u the way 
to serve 
office, is there still an "electoral,...n,nn.,:,.,...t,lnn as Mayhew suggests? Do 
legislators continue to conduct !JV.I..L ................. nllC' 1 TI""'C'C' with the goal of reelection? And 
when legislators are in their last is --.,.~.,. .... 1".1 '""11 
consideration in their political behavior? ............................ J 
legislators interact with their ...,...,J, ... _, .. j ... ",,., ....... ...,.., 
important component? In essence, 
post-term limits 
to another an important 
have term limits changed how 
continue to be an 
now spend time doing in 
turnover 2008 when the ,.r.,..::-nn .... .,.n 
legislators elected in 2000 are term ........... , ............. 
the House where over half the TY'IATY'I""'""'TC' 
Will there be greater than normal 
other opportunities? Future ... ...,..,, ..... ~,,.., ..... 
some cases reentering 
recruitment of quality '"'" .... u .... ~ ....... ,,.,., 
formerly term .......... '"""'r1 ........ ,.r>", ... .,.rC' 
Nothing in the 
This is particularly applicable 
that single '-'J."''"'"n .. ,u 
.,. ..... ~.,.,,.,,.'"", .. "' have 
on 
a 
a 
seat 8 are it is 
none 
to term limits. 
One interesting ... A .......... u,,_, 
between the House 
members the Senate, almost all 
advantages terms public 
will the 
............... v ........... ,"" .... to House? 
...,L ........ ~",..., in governors ....,. .. ,""...,.....,.·"'""" 2006 that 
may ultimately show how much power the legislature. 
say that 
Since he 
have been 1 m,niPTnP•nl".1'•1'1 it is hard to say 
All interview subjects when 
new governor will not have 
been the only governor since term 
another person in 
legislature emboldening the ru,. .. 'H.,.r 
how term 
both they there and who is 
Will be 
.. A .... u ...... ..,,,.,.,.,.., over to 
seen as new legislators enter era term 
an interesting area 
The Impact of 
Have term 
If the goal was to 
~Trl1r'l<lii'TOr11 the ,._.,,-,....,rln ,..,,..,.1C'•I<lf"'llT"O 
electoral competition, it 
limits has forced long-term legislators from office capping 
creating an increase turnover. Greater competition 
to 8 years and 
seats has been the 
consequence. However, because incumbent legislators have a predictable timetable of 
tenure in office, incumbents are now a ..... ,...""'~ quality 
challengers are waiting their tum when the seat eventually up. Legislators are 
reelected at higher rates than decade previous to the implementation of term 
limits largely due to redistricting. Incumbents are now more often unopposed, in both 
the primary and desire to 
has been successful, but at the cost greater incumbency protections in 
Overall, term limits has not brought about 
elected post-term limits. Proponents argued an obvious "" ... '"""","""'"""" would be a ~""'"t-"""" 
number of historically 
and minorities. There has not been a 
electe~a to the state .. .,.,1:-J .................... .. 
still remains 
women 
number women 
women 
a 
Alternatively, 
was to seats create more 
opportunities for Republican ..., .... ~ ..................... ...., .... . 
both chambers. the tide 
favor during this period and happened to ,...""''T11r~•n"" solidified by 
redistricting. Legislators in the Republican-controlled ...... u ............ ,..., ...... 
ballot initiative to the term limit length from 8 to years, but ultimately gave 
up that quest in 2006 (Bousquet, 6 May 2006). 
state congressional 
was to rid the legislative bodies of career politicians and to electing citizen 
legislators. Term proponents touted principle of rotation to serve 
government and go home to the trade or profession you came from- not to make 
politics a career. This Term limits has not created this "citizen 
legislator" class. 
careers either in higher office or 
legislators are still interested in political 
presenttea here, back home local office. 
Many former legislators who ......... , ................ ...,.. "retire" from political do so 
because they lose a race for ......... , ......... ..., ... .................... not because they to go back to 
private political 
sphere as lobbyists or 
newly "-'J."'-""''-\..•\..1. "''"'F'-.11."' ........... '-' .. "' 
VJ..J,J. ...................................... ,f".. to the House or as to are 
if 
power in 
A....,J-,, ..... .u ...... ..,, • ...,. to accomplish it is 
rise to the influence 
The in power lobbyists, the governor is not that surprising, 
me:mt>er:snro. Term limited members looking given the inexperience the 1-Vj::...l.:lU.JL\-J. 
to continue with a .... '"' .. T.,. .... 
unsuccessful at winning elected •·"_, ........ ..., ...... 
lobbyists and will important in the 
Contrary to what proponents thought 
certainly not 
not wanting another or 
will likely stay the game as legislative 
because of knowledge and money. 
har>oe:n. lobbyists and special interests 
that lobbyists 
have actually gained the most ....... _, ........... , .. ""' ..... vv ............... ~..., 
process. Some 
term limits. 
Lastly, term thought the legislature would benefit 
from fresh faces and new branch. 
However, the power the executive has ...... u_ ..... ..,,_ favor of the 
demands. governor. The legislature, particularly the House all but acQIUte:sce:a 
While Bush has been one of the most powerful governors in 
institutional advantages the ..., ..... ,.,......, ... , .... 
continue to ""'""-~"""""" 
sum, the success 
turnover. movement not 
to ensure legislative 
seats 
.., ............... , ..... more opportunity 
seen. limits 
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